Imprimir

JULIAN SCHVINDLERMAN holds a master’s degree in Society and Politics from The HebrewUniversity in Jerusalem. He is a regu­lar contributor to The Miami Herald, and is the Washington corre­spondent of Comunidades, a Jewish biweekly of Argentina.

«We live complicated lives. Our identities are complicated. We are Arabs of Israel. We are Palestinians. We are part of the Palestinian people. And yet, on the other hand, we carry Israeli identity cards. We do not deny this fact. We live between these two definitions.» So said in an interview last year, Abed al-Razak Hassan, spokesperson for Israeli-Arab Member of Knesset (MK) Adbel Malik Dehamshe.(1)

His remarks give expression to the problematic status the Arab minority enjoys in Israel. The Jewish nature of the state inevitably creates identity problems for Israel’s Arab citizens. Israel is defined as the homeland of the Jewish people. Its main language is Hebrew. Its official holidays and symbols are exclusively Jewish. Its immigration laws clearly favor Jewish immigration, whereas land-allocations are fashioned according to Zionist interests. As many soci­ologists have pointed out, the national goals of the state are ensconced in the traditional Zionist ethos: strengthening national security, ingathering the exiles, reviving the Hebrew language, developing Jewish culture, reinforcing Jewish-Diaspora relations, and settling the land. Zionist education calls for cultivating a sense of love of the land and personal identification with the reborn Israel.

In recent years, the Post-Zionist avant-garde has zeal­ously fought to alter this education by introducing a more universalistic view and a narrative of historical events that significantly departs from the traditional Zionist account, but this fact does not diminish the impact that the Jewish-Zionist character of the state has had, and still has, on its Arab minority. Take, for instance, the flag (with a Star of David at its center), or the national anthem (with its mes­sage of Jewish longing to return to Zion). How could a Muslim or Christian Arab possibly identify with these basic national symbols? «It is ridiculous to expect me to sing the anthem,» said Sallah Tarif, the first Arab minister in an Israeli government, defending his decision not to sing the Hatikvah at a Labor gathering. «I am a proud Israeli, but I represent a million Israelis who cannot bring themselves to sing a song about “the Jewish soul,» Tarif explained.(2) (Amid charges of corruption, Tarif would eventually resign.)

This sentiment, widespread in the Arab community, has led to the emergence of demands to alter these national symbols in order to allow for Arab identification.

Understandably, the Jewish state cannot accommodate such wishes. Many other ethnic minorities have identity problems vis-à-vis national symbols in their host countries, and hardly dare they suggest, much less demand, modifi­cations of the flags or anthems. Democratic nations such as Norway, Sweden, and England carry a cross on their flags — not to mention the Red Crescent adorning the flags of many Muslim countries — and none of these nations would permit changes out of sensitivity for the feelings of its minorities. Neither should Israel. (In any case, as Dr. Yoram Hazony has aptly observed, it is hard to imagine what other symbol other than the Red Crescent that Israeli Muslim Arabs could identify with. So, unless Israelis are ready to add it to their flag, no quick solution seems to be at hand in this regard).

From the inception of the state and subsequent exodus of a majority of their society’s members, the Arab community of Israel has consistently suffered from an identity crisis, caught uncomfortably between Israeli citizenship and Arab nationality. Over the years, the community has become more nationalistic as a result of several factors and historical events: the 1967 Six-Day War, the birth and growth of the Islamic movement since the late 1970s, the first Intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the advent of the peace process during most of the past decade. These elements have visibly contributed to the process of nationalization among the Arabs of Israel. Events such as the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and the second Intifada have shown just how deep and real this change has been. These events and movements were probably the most significant catalysts in the forging of an increasingly solid Palestinian identity, engendering even active participation by Arabs inside the Green Line on behalf of their brethren in the «territories.» As a result, lines are often blurred between the civic grievances of a minority population and the nationalistic demands per­taining to larger issues of citizenship and identity.

Traditionally, the popular consensus in Israel viewed its Arab minority (optimistically) as a bridge toward the Arab world as well as (pessimistically) a potential «fifth col­umn.» So long as the Jewish state was exposed to existen­tial dangers emanating from Arab countries, the Arab minority was viewed, understandably, with suspicion. The hope was that the signing of peace treaties between Israel and its neighbors would eventually help Israelis to get rid of this legitimate concern. Paradoxically, the Oslo accords accomplished the exact opposite. During this period, the Arab community has gone through a process of rapid and alarming radicalization, characterized by an ever increasing sense of emotional and national identification with their Palestinian brothers. This process of Palestinization developed in sharp contrast to the previous process of Israelization that was in place between the years 1948-1967.(3) The former began to evolve after the territories fell into Israeli hands in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, but it intensified sternly with the advent of the Oslo agree­ments. In 1948, the 150,000 Arabs who chose to stay in the new state became Israeli citizens but remained, at the same time, «emotionally, nationally, culturally, and confessionally» bound to the Arab world.(4) Physically de­tached from the Arab world, living in a Jewish state, iden­tities and loyalties emerged as grave dilemmas. The 1967 war triggered a return to their Palestinian roots when it reunified both communities across the Green Line. This war awoke the Palestinian consciousness of Israel’s Arabs; time and history affirmed it subsequently.

One clear manifestation of this phenomenon is the Arab-Israelis’ commemoration of what they call their «Naqba» (catastrophe) every May 15 — the anniversary of Israel’s founding according to the Gregorian calendar — and an event held annually since 1997. Occasionally, Palestinian or black flags have been raised at their rallies. The Supreme Arab Monitoring Committee — an um­brella organization of Arab political parties and non-par­tisan groups — recently began to observe the date with a minute of silence. At least on one occasion, it decided to send a delegation to take part in a joint demonstration of protest with Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line. On one May 15th, unprecedented, an Arab-Israeli parlia­mentarian invited reporters into his Knesset office to wit­ness his observance of the minute of silence. More often than not, the Palestinian national anthem is played at graduation ceremonies in Arab-Israeli schools.

The onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada saw a marked dete­rioration in Jewish-Arab relations. Undoubtedly, the already delicate relations were quite serious­ly damaged; probably for a long time to come. As their Palestinian brothers were attacking Israel from every direc­tion, the Arab-Israelis joined in the assault. The sight of rioting Arab mobs chanting «Itbah elyehud!» (slaughter the Jews), as they stoned Jewish drivers, blocked roads, and burned Israeli flags, left a scar on Israeli society. Their later complaints of police brutality (13 Arabs were killed during the confrontations), and their daring attempt to present their behavior as nothing more than a peaceful protest against state abuse and discrimination, were not received favorably by the Jewish majority. In what could be inter­preted as an attempt at calming Israelis but that had quite the opposite effect, one of the Arabs’ elected leaders, MK Abdel Dehamshe, cavalierly declared soon after the riot­ing began that only «20-25 percent of them would like to destroy the State of Israel and kill the Jews.»(5)

There have been previous instances of anti-Jewish Arab violence in Israel. In 1976, the Israeli government decision to expropriate land in the Galilee for development purposes was met by angry opposition from the Arab community. Calling it a scheme to «Judaize» the north, the Arab leadership called for a general strike, which led to a melee with security forces resulting in the deaths of six Arabs. From then on, the event has been marked as «Land Day.» Similarly, there were violent demonstrations after the 1982 massacre in the Lebanese refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, as well as during the early years of the first Intifada. In 1988 alone, the Arabs of Israel committed more than 200 acts of sabotage, including knifings, grenade throwing, shootings, and molotov-cocktail assaults. At the end of 1989, the Israeli police discovered a terrorist organization named «Saiqa Force-Daburiyya» composed of some two dozen Israeli-Arabs.(6) During the last decade, there have been another 25 or more Israeli-Arabs involved in terrorism, most of them supporters of Islamic radical groups in Israel and the Palestinian autonomous areas.(7) In the larger context of a population that today numbers 1.2 million Arabs in Israel, the partic­ipation of Arab-Israeli citizens in terrorism has been small, but it has been the cause nonetheless of grave con­cern among Israelis.

During the last two or three years in particular, the Arab community has displayed evident hostility toward its fellow Jewish citizens. The most significant events that have dramatically reflected this enmity have been Israel’s withdrawal from the security zone in South Lebanon and the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

The withdrawal itself was celebrated as an «Arab victory» with shocking openness on Israel’s soil. In June 2001, the Arab political party Democratic National Union orga­nized a “festival of freedom and dignity» in honor of the Lebanese Shi’ites who fought Israeli soldiers in South Lebanon. Arab-Israeli parliamentarian Azmi Bishara addressed the audience: “Hezbollah has won, and for the first time since 1967, we have tasted the sweet taste of vic­tory.» [Emphasis added](8) A minute of silence was ob­served for «the martyrs who were killed during the war against the Zionist enemy» reported an Arab-Israeli news­paper.(9) The Committee of Arab Mayors in Israel immedi­ately voiced its opposition to the settlement of South Lebanon Army (SLA) members and their families in Arab villages within Israeli territory. The SLA had been an ally of Israel for the previous two decades fighting Syrian and Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. As such, its members were considered “traitors» by Israel’s Arabs. Arab newspapers in Israel editorialized exuberantly on the glorious Lebanese resistance. Hundreds of Israeli Arabs went to the border to join Lebanese villagers and Hezbollah supporters in their anti-Israel demonstrations. In some cases, they even en­couraged the throwing of stones and other objects from the Lebanese side of the border at Israeli soldiers.(10)

Even before the current Intifada, Israelis could hear alarming expressions of rejection emanating from the Arab community. For example, an Egyptian magazine quoted in mid-2000 the editor at large of the Arab-Israeli weekly Kul al-Arab saying that» [e]ven if 250 million Arabs normalize their relations with Israel, he alone would oppose it.»(11) With the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, these expressions became dangerously extremist. The present uprising/war owes its name to the creative mind of Member of Knesset (MK) Ahmed Tibi, who chose to instill a religious imprimatur on the uprising by terming it «Al-Aqsa.»(12) For the first time, anti-Israel demonstra­tions took place simultaneously within Israel and the Palestinian areas. «It seemed as if the ‘Green Line’ between Israel and the Palestinian Authority — formerly strictly adhered to by the Israeli Arabs — vanished entire­ly,» commented Israeli academic Reuven Paz.(13)

In such a volatile context, one would expect that the Arab leadership would behave responsibly, and that, by example, it would attempt to calm tensions. Sadly, the Arabs’ elected representatives to the Knesset gave new impetus to the inter-ethnic hostility. Their deeds and words did nothing to soothe an already restless atmos­phere. It is worth noting that, when elected to the Knesset, these Arab MKs, as all MKs, are required to pledge: «I undertake the obligation of loyalty to the State of Israel and to fulfill in good faith my mission in the Knesset.» Now consider the following.

When Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in September 2000, some Arab MKs greeted him with epi­thets such as «Hitler» and «child murderer.» In November 2000, when Israel was consumed with the Palestinian upris­ing, Hadash party leader MK Mohammed Barakei encour­aged Arab participation in the violence: «Israeli Arabs bless the Intifada and must take part in it.»(14) Another MK United Arab List leader Abdul Malik Dehamshe, com­pared Sharon to Milosevic, called for the democratically-elected leader to stand trial for war crimes, and sent a let­ter to the Nobel Peace Prize Committee requesting that Foreign Minister Shimon Peres be stripped of his award for being part of the national-unity government.(15)

In an interview with Palestinian television at the begin­ning of 2001, Labor member (and then cabinet minister) Sallah Tarif wished the best of health to Hamas spiritual leader Ahmed Yassin.(16) He also criticized the Israeli Police for shooting at «people who were just throwing stones.»(17) After Israel sent F-16 jets to bombard Palestinian military installations in retaliation for a suicide bombing that took five lives and left more than 100 wounded in the city of Netanya in May 2001, Tarif com­plained: «What are they going to do next time there’s a bombing, respond with an atomic bomb?»(18)

When, due to security concerns, the IDF imposed a clo­sure on Palestinian areas, Hadash MK Issam Mahoul claimed that closing off Ramallah was tantamount to putting the Palestinians in one large «concentration camp.»(19) After the Jerusalem municipality ordered the demolition of 14 illegally built Arab homes in July 2001, this MK called Jerusalem mayor Ehud Olmert a «fascist who committed a crime.»(20) He also referred to the Israeli government as the «Israeli Taliban government.»(21) MK Taleb a-Saana went so far as to publicly praise a terror attack against Israelis in downtown Tel Aviv, terming it «an attack of special quality.»(22) After Mauritania’s foreign minister visited Israel — in defiance of an Arab League call on all its members to sever ties with the Jewish state, issued just four days before — a-Saana urged the League to kick Mauritania out of its ranks.(23)

Given that, with few and very minor exceptions, the Arab community at large of Israel did not take issue with their representatives’ incitement, one cannot escape the conclusion that they view this extreme speech favorably. This logical assumption is actually confirmed by a 2001 survey of attitudes of the adult Arab population of Israel toward the state conducted by the Institute for Peace Research at Givat Haviva. According to this survey, «the respondents report a high level of identification with the Intifada.» Fifty-eight percent feel that the events of the Intifada have estranged them from the state (the boycott of the past elections are an indication of this). The survey found that 80 percent of Arabs prefer to vote for Arab instead of Zionist parties. Only 32 percent said that the description of «Israeli» is appropriate to their self-identity. A mere 27 percent is willing to fly the Israeli flag on their homes or cars on Israel’s Independence Day.  Most dis­turbing, over 46 percent of the Arabs of Israel reject Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state.(24)

By now, the picture should be clear. Israel has in its midst an irredentist population that totals 1.2 mil­lion. After witnessing the realization of Palestinian autonomy in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, it is just a matter of time until they themselves will start to agitate for their own self-determination in the Galilee, Ramla, Haifa, the Negev, and other densely Arab-populated areas. Voices can already be heard. According to the above-cited survey, almost 30 percent of Israeli-Arabs agree to the annexation of the vil­lages in the Triangle region to the future Palestinian state. Sheik Jum’a Al-Qasasi, mayor of the Bedouin town Rahat in the Negev, warned of a future «Intifada [that] shall burst out from the Negev.»(25) Similarly, MK Taleb a-Saana hinted at a Negev Intifada along the lines of Hezbollah’s resistance: «Now, after the admirable struggle and sacrifice of Hezbollah put an end to the occupation, we are left with only one area: the Negev.»(26)

Of course, the Palestinian Authority was more than happy to provide assistance in this regard — it established a department within Yasir Arafat’s office called the Committee for Contacts with Citizens of Conquered Palestine, whose stated mission was plainly obvious by its name. Clearly, its purpose went beyond promoting musi­cal  festivals.(27)  In  early  March   2002,  the  Monitoring Committee of the Arab Israeli Leadership (an organiza­tion comprising most of the Arab community’s national and municipal leaders) announced a general strike in sol­idarity with the Palestinians and against Israel’s «policies of aggression.» The announcement was made at a rally in the Central Galilee town of Sakhnin — which featured a telephone address by Arafat — during one of the worst periods of anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorism. The actual strike took place just one day after a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 13 Israelis and wounded over 100 in a Jerusalem cafe. Organizers later said the strike was «the most widely supported in the history of the Arab commu­nity in Israel» and the committee’s spokesperson, Abed Inbitawi, celebrated the strike as a «great success» that expressed «the collective stance of the Arab community over what is being inflicted on our Palestinian brethren in the occupied territories.»(28)

Things were really deteriorating to the point that, also in March 2002, the Israeli government had to rush a bill through the Knesset that will prosecute Arab citizens of the state who would join, recruit, or help the Palestinian Authority’s armed forces. Documents found at Orient House (the PA unofficial east Jerusalem headquarters) showed that thousands of Israeli-Arabs from east Jerusalem alone had been volunteering to serve in the Palestinian security services. Indeed, as Haifa University professor Steven Plaut once chillingly remarked, we may one morning wake up to hear from an east Jerusalem, Negev, or «Galilee Liberation Organization.»(29)

To be sure, the Arabs of Israel have legitimate griev­ances: they have been under military rule for two decades, they have been discriminated against, they have been under-represented in public institutions, in academia, in the media, and in other spheres of national life. At the same time, for a minority so intimately connected to, and identified with, enemy countries, this should hardly be surprising. In fact, the Arab minority enjoys in Israel indi­vidual rights and civil liberties that their brothers cannot even begin to dream of in any of the twenty-plus Arab countries in which they reside. Their identity problems are real and understandable as well, but they can’t expect the Jewish state to defer to all of their requests in this area — especially concerning those issues related to the state’s national and religious identity.

Israelis should exercise discretion when addressing the complaints of the Arab community. To be blunt, they need to separate the wheat from the chaff. At present, a revolt against the very existence of Israel as a Jewish state is being camouflaged as a civic protest against state dis­crimination. Common sense would term this dangerous and unacceptable. Israel should not expect the Arab minority to sing happily a national anthem that speaks of a «Jewish soul» and a «return to Zion.» Nor should it hope to see the Arabs joyfully celebrating Independence Day. After all, they lost many relatives in that war. But, whereas Israelis don’t expect the Arabs to dance on the streets car­rying Israeli flags on Yom Ha’Atzma’ut, they certainly do expect them at the very least to refrain from raising the Hezbollah flag and singing the PLO anthem — especial­ly so when those groups are conducting a war against the state.  For it is one thing to boycott the state’s symbols on the grounds of identity issues (a delicate matter in and of itself), and quite another to praise, encourage, and side with Israel’s foes on nationalistic grounds.

In short, the Arab community in Israel has yet to inter­nalize a simple fact: rights are premised on loyalty to the state. Or, as the long-time MK from the Meretz party Amnon Rubinstein said: «You cannot expect equal rights from a state whose very legitimate right to exist you deny.»(30) No, Arab-Israelis cannot simultaneously carry a Hezbollah flag in one hand and a sign protesting the lack of infrastructure in their towns in the other.

The decision is theirs to make. Either they abandon their seditious behavior and focus solely on raising public concern about their grievances, or they continue along their rejectionist path and gain nothing but justifiable Israeli suspicion. If they choose the former, they will like­ly be surprised by the extent of Israeli sympathy. If they choose the latter, they will be casting themselves as pari­ahs in a democratic society, perpetuating their «fifth col­umn» status with every seditious act.

Notes:

1. Interview with Independent Media Review) and Analysis (IMHA), April 24, 2001.
2. The Jerusalem Post, Weekend Supplement, March 9, 2001.
3. See Jacob M. Landau. The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967-1991, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
4. Elie Rekhess, «Arabs in a Jewish State: Images vs. Realities,» Middle East Insight, January/February 1990.
5. Ma’ariv, Weekend Supplement, October 20, 2000.
6. Elie Rekhess, «Arabs in a Jewish State: Images vs. Realities.» Middle East Insight, January/February 1990.
7. Reuven Paz, «The Israeli Arabs and Lebanon: A New Phase?» Peace Watch No.265, June 19, 2000, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
8. Ha’aretz English Edition, Nov. 13, 2001.
9. Fasl al-Maqal (Nazareth), June 9, 2001, quoted in Special Dispatch, No. 105,Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).June 21, 2001.
10. Reuven Paz, «The Israeli Arabs and Lebanon: A New Phase?» Peace Watch No. 265, June 19, 2000, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
11. In Special Dispatch No. 117, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), August 10, 2000.
12. Reuven Paz, «The Israeli Arabs: Defending Al-Aqsa or Fighting for Equality?,» Peace Watch No. 281, October 3, 2000, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
13. Ibid.
14. Ma’ariv, November 5, 2000.
15. The Jerusalem Post, April 17,2001.
16. Palestinian television, January 23, 2001. Translated by Palestinian  Media Watch (PMW).
17. The Jerusalem Post, March 9, 2001.
18. The Jerusalem Post, May 21, 2001.
19. The Jerusalem Post, March 13, 2001.
20. The Jerusalem Post, July 11, 2001.
21. The Jerusalem Past, July 5, 2001.
22. Ha’aretz, August 6, 2001.
23. I have documented the record of these Arab MKs during the past year. For fur­ther information please see Julian Schvindlerman, «Israel’s Parliamentary Intifada,» The Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2002.
24.  «2001 Survey: Attitudes of the Arabs to the State of Israel,» http://www.dialogate.org.il/peace/pubHcattons.asp
25. Al-Simira, June 8, 2000, quoted in Special Dispatch No. 105, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), June 21, 2001.
26. Kul Al-Arab, June 8, 2000, quoted in Special Dispatch No. 105, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), June 21, 2001.
27. PLO attempts at engaging the Arab population of Israel in its war of terror date back to 1972 when the Palestine National Congress (PNC) passed a resolution incorporating Israeli-Arabs into the struggle. Three Israeli-Arabs were elected to the PNC at the time. The 1976 «Land Day» was adopted by the PLO and added to its national calendar. See Elie Rekhess, «Arabs in a Jewish State: Images vs. Realities,» Middle East Insight, January/February 1990.
28. The Jerusalem Post. March I 1, 2002.
29. Steven Plant, «Palestinian Irredentism: A Warning from History,» The Middle East Quarterly, June 1999.
30. Ha’aretz, May 16, 2000, quoted in Special Dispatch No. 96, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), May 26, 2000.