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Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Understanding Iran’s nuclear threat – 30/05/03

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«The use of a nuclear bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the ground.»

Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Long ago Israel placed Iran as its No. 1 national-security strategic threat. The five leading intelligence services (those of the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, France and Germany) have warned about the Iranian nuclearization program. The Islamic Republic has at least seven nuclear facilities. According to military experts, Iran could produce its first nuclear weapon in one to three years, and dozens annually afterward.

This — as Chen Zak, who served in the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, points out — despite Iran being the only state in the Middle East that is party to all nonproliferation agreements. That should be least surprising, given recent experience with Iraq and North Korea — both signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and holders of advanced, clandestine nuclear-weapons projects nonetheless.

The CIA describes Iran as the world’s «foremost state sponsor of terrorism.» It shelters al Qaeda leaders, provides military and financial assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas and other radical Muslim groups and already has weapons of mass destruction. This fundamentalist theocracy is ideologically and theologically committed to Israel’s annihilation.

Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, head of the Israel Defense Forces’ Planning and Policy Division, said cryptically: Everyone should be able to understand the nature of the conflict in the Middle East when there is an Iranian nuclear threat.»

The question is what to do, and much will depend on how the West — Washington and Jerusalem in particular — perceive Iranian motives. Is Iran’s nuclear program intended for defensive purposes only, a deterrent to a prospective foreign attack? Or is Iran intent on offensive aggression, as Rafsanjani seemed to have suggested? And against whom? Just Israel? If so, why is Iran developing missiles capable of reaching European capitals and the United States, too?

While the Iranians have shown to be more sophisticated than irrational Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the reckless Kim Jong IPs North Korea, questions remain as to how a nuclearized Iran might affect state behavior.

Michael Eisenstadt, a military and security affairs analyst, offers a few possibilities drawn from past experience: «During the Cold War, nuclear weapons generally moderated superpower behavior. Conversely, such weapons have not prevented India and Pakistan from engaging in low-level conflict and approaching the nuclear brink several times, while Iraq’s maturing weapons-of-mass-destruction programs bred confidence that led to increasingly aggressive behavior in the late 1980s, culminating in the invasion of Kuwait.»

While Iran’s potential conduct is not entirely clear, there seems to be consensus in Washington and Jerusalem about the need to stop, or at least contain or delay, Iran’s nuclearization project. And here another question arises: How to do it? First, diplomatic and economic pressure will be exerted. If this mix fails, a preemptive military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would not be ruled out.

Michael Knights, a defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, reminds us that preemptive strikes on nuclear sites are uncommon but not unprecedented. As Knights observes, Germany’s nuclear program was attacked during World War II; Iraq’s Osiraq reactor was bombed both by Iran and Israel in 1980 and 1981 respectively, whereas Iraq attacked Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant during the Iran-Iraq war.

Additionally, during the 1991 Gulf War the United States attacked the al-Tuwaitha nuclear site and in 1993 fired 44 Tomahawk missiles at the Zafaraniyah enriched-uranium facility.

Tehran could respond in various ways. It could use al Qaeda to attack U.S. cities by proxy. It could greenlight Hezbollah to launch the some 12,000 rockets it has, with hundreds of them able to reach as far as Haifa. It could sponsor terrorist operations against U.S. allies in the Gulf and Israeli and U.S. targets abroad.

It could try to destabilize the governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could unleash a chemical and biological direct attack on Israel and U.S. interests in the region. And, of course, it could resort to a combination of, or all these options at the same time.

This is not a rosy scenario. But neither is the prospect of radical mullahs having the capability to produce a Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the Middle East.

Julián Schvindlerman, a political analyst, is author of Land for Peace, Land for War (in spanish) and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Likud makes a historic U-turn – 30/05/03

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The Israeli Right received a tremendous blow this week. On Sunday, a Likud-led right-wing government formally adopted the road map, the latest diplomatic initiative to restart Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. The national camp in Israel sees it as a deeply flawed document — concocted by Arabists in Europe, the United Nations and the U.S. Department of State — significantly parting from President Bush’s speech of June 24, 2002. Through such an acceptance, for the first time in its history, the Likud Party endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state in the land of Israel.

On Monday, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon publicly defended his support of the road map, terming the Israeli presence in the territories as an «occupation» which was «terrible.» That a prime minister from the Likud Party, and a key leader in the settlement enterprise, would adopt terminology that belongs in left-wing circles marks a political earthquake of mammoth proportions. This is indeed a monumental U-turn for the Likud.

The cabinet’s decision and Sharon’s declarations have to be understood in the current political international and regional context. Sharon probably believes that it would be unaffordable for an already isolated Israel to loose the support of the only true ally that the country has in the world: Bush’s America. Besides, it could be that he thinks that the road map will never really take off, given Palestinian domestic infighting, for instance. So, by accepting the peace plan, he essentially throws the ball back to the Palestinian camp, hoping that it won’t bounce and, thus, deflects global diplomatic pressure.

But — whatever the reasons motivating the government’s adoption of the peace plan, its endorsement of a Palestinian state and the premier’s controversial statements — the consequences of these developments cannot be underestimated. For they may have damaged, perhaps irreparably, Israel’s case — historically, legally and morally — and will have a profound impact on the country’s future.

The powerful link of the Jews with the land of Israel dates back millennia. It was in the hills of Samaria (the West Bank) where the biblical prophets taught mankind eternal lessons and Jewish kings such as David and Salomon ruled. Jerusalem and Hebron highlight the connection between the Jewish people and Israel in a way that Tel-Aviv and Haifa never will. By referring to the Jewish presence in these areas as an «occupation,» Sharon has portrayed Israelis as colonial settlers living in a land that does not belong to them — a point often made by the Palestinians, Arabs and Western critics of Israel.

‘DISPUTED TERRITORIES’

Such characterization will have a disastrous effect on Israel concerning world public opinion. Traditionally, Israeli diplomats referred to Samaria and Gaza as «disputed territories» ~ a fair, neutral terminology that reflects a fact: namely, that these areas are being disputed by both sides. It says nothing of whose right to these areas is more or less legitimate.

Sharon’s problematic wording likely intended to imply that the Israeli army cannot stay indefinitely in Ramallah and did not try to sever the Jewish tie to the Land («We are not occupiers. This is the homeland of the Jewish people,» Sharon would later clarify). Yet Israel’s historic right to the land has been called into question, its legal standing has been tarnished and the moral ground has been ceded to the Palestinians. All in one stroke by none other than Sharon. Unbelievable.

As to Palestinian statehood, some see it as the solution to Israel’s demographic predicament, wich is real and calls for sober answers. The Sharon administration understands this and seems to have grudgingly acquiesced to Palestinian independence. Naturally, it conditioned it on a complete and final rejection by the Palestinians of their so-called right of return.

The logic is simple. If the rationale to withdraw from the disputed areas is to prevent a demographic nightmare, then it would be evidently useless (not to say suicidal) for Israel, which is smaller than New Jersey, to grant Palestinian statehood and then accept millions of Palestinian refugees within its shrunken borders. Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas’ insistence on realizing this «right» of return, as he told the Israeli daily Ha’aretz this week after the cabinet approval of the road map, is not auspicious, to say the least.

With its historic decision, the Likud-led Israeli government has shown impressive ideological flexibility. Now it is up to the Palestinian leadership to respond in kind.

Julián Schvindlerman, a political analyst, is author of Land for Peace, Land for War (in spanish) and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Four steps to become the Palestinian Sadat – 09/05/03

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What do Palestinian Mahmoud Abbas, American David Duke and British David Irving have in common? They all are Holocaust deniers. In what do they differ? In that just one of them, the Palestinian, was made a prime minister.

Only in the Middle East can such a thing possibly happen. Imagine the scandal, were Duke to run for U.S. president or Irving run for Parliament in Great Britain. In the West, these «historical revisionists,» as they liked to be called, belong to the fringes of society. In the West Bank, they belong to officialdom.

Ironically enough, Abbas was sworn in on Holocaust Remembrance Day. His Ph.D. thesis — he devoted many years to «prove» that the Zionist movement collaborated with the Nazis in the extermination of the Jews during World War II and to question the fact that six millions Jews were killed during that period — was submitted to a Soviet university in 1982, and two years later it was turned into a book. He was 50 years old then. This was no youthful mistake.

But he is a moderate, we are told, just as we were told years ago that Bashar Assad, son of Hafez, was a moderate because he surfed the Web and studied ophthalmology in England. Of course, this was before he accused the Jews of killing Jesus, with the pope at his side and in front of millions of television viewers. Yasser Arafat was also heralded as a moderate during the happy days of the Oslo process, and it took many fateful years and precious lives for the world community to see that the Palestinian peace prophet was in fact an unredeemed terrorist.

All this notwithstanding, I wouldn’t write Abbas off out of hand. Anwar Sadat was a Nazi sympathizer — in 1953 he even published in a Cairo daily an open letter to Adolf Hitler, praising him («I bless you with all my heart,» he wrote) — before he made his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1979 and paid for that with his own life in 1981. Could Abbas be the Palestinian Sadat?

To prove his Western supporters right, Abbas should issue four public statements in English and Arabic, both on CNN and Palestinian television. He must:

  • Repudiate his doctoral dissertation.
  • Announce a stop to official incitement in mosques, media and school curricula.
  • Reject the so-called Palestinian right of return to Israel.
  • Call for an end to the four-decade-long «armed struggle,» and not just the «military aspects» of the intifada.

These announcements inevitably would carry a considerable domestic political price, but without them, Abbas’ tenure would be a nonstarter as far as the peace project is concerned.

Abbas will notbe able to do this as long as Arafat blocks him. Arafat, the perpetual saboteur, will do everything in his power to remain politically relevant, and he retains considerable leverage given that he controls the portfolio of peace negotiations. Unfortunately, this internal power struggle will explode in the direction of Israel – as the latest terrorist attacks against Israelis amply demonstrate.

Israel celebrated its anniversary this week. At 55, it painfully knows the cost of political fantasies.

Necessary skepticism toward an interlocutor whose peace credentials are yet to be established, combined with measured optimism in the country’s ability to gain regional acceptance, might prove to be a healthy recipe for national survival and lasting peace.

Julián Schvindlerman, a political analyst, is author of Land for Peace, Land for War and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Midstream

Midstream

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

«Un momentito, señor»: The 20 seconds that made history – 05/03

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This article is based on my interview with Peter Z. Malkin on February 12, 2002 in WashingtonD.C. and on Malkin’s book (co-authored with Harry Stein), Eichmann In My Hands (New York: Warner Books, 1990)–JULIAN SCHVINDLERMAN.

JULIAN SCHVINDLERMAN is a political analyst currently based in Geneva and a regular contributor to The Miami Herald and Comunidades, a Jewish biweekly of Argentina. He was also Jerusalem and Washington correspondent of Comunidades. He is the author of Land for Peace, Land for War (in Spanish).

Zvi Milchman spent the first four years of his life in Zolkiewka, a small village in Poland. None of his neighbors, relatives, and friends could have imagined at the time that, decades later, this boy would become a daring Israeli secret agent whose path along the world of espionage would grant him an historic role and a legendary reputation as the man who physically caught Adolf Hitler’s main executioner and one of the most wanted Nazi fugitives in the post-Holocaust era: Adolf Eichmann.

The Polish young man (who years later would adopt the name of Peter Malkin) emigrated to Palestine with his family in 1933. At the age of 12, he joined the Palestine Jewish underground as an expert in explosives. Once the State of Israel was established, Malkin was recruited by Mossad (Israel’s intelligence service) where, using his skills as a master of martial arts and disguises, he rose through the ranks from field operative to chief of operations. In his 27-year-tenure in the secret service, Malkin participated in various anti-terror operations. Among his most outstanding feats, the capture of Israel Be’er -the Soviet spy who had penetrated the highest levels of the Israeli government -as well as his lead role in the operation against German Nazi rocket scientists assisting Egypt’s weapons development program after World War II, deserve special mention.

But it was undoubtedly his deed on the evening of May 11, 1960, in a remote town in the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, that placed Malkin in the pantheon of heroes of the Jewish people. That day, Israeli agents hunted down the German officer under whose directives six million Jews perished during the Holocaust -and Peter Malkin was there, capturing Adolf Eichmann (1906-1962) with his own hands.

SS-Oberstumbannfuehrer Eichmann’s record is notorious. He was head of the Department for Jewish Affairs in the Gestapo from 1941 to 1945 and was chief of operations in the deportation of three million Jews to extermination camps. He joined the Austrian Nazi Party in 1932 and later became a member of the SS. In 1933 -the year Zvi arrived in Palestine -Eichmann, then an obscure 27-year-old SS sergeant, was about to begin his impressive career in the Nazi hierarchy. In 1934, he served as an SS corporal at the Dachau concentration camp. By 1935, Eichmann was already investigating possible «solutions to the Jewish question.» Two years later, in 1937, he was sent to Palestine to establish contacts with the rabidly anti-Semitic Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the most prominent leader of Palestinian nationalism at the time; but British authorities forced him to leave. In 1938, Eichmann was sent to Vienna where he established a «Center for .Jewish Emigration» that was so successful that similar offices were soon established in Prague and Berlin. A year later, he returned to Berlin to become Director of Jewish Affairs and Evacuation in the Reich Security Main Office. In 1942, Eichmann organized the infamous Wansee Conference where the program of Jewish extermination was adopted. He subsequently supervised the deportation of European Jews to the death camps, as well as the plunder of the property they had left behind.

Eichmann was arrested at the war’s end and confined to an American internment camp, but he managed to escape to Argentina. He lived there for ten years under the name of Ricardo Klement until Israeli secret agents abducted him in 1960 and spirited him out to Israel. On April 2, 1961, the trial of Eichmann opened in .Jerusalem. Eight months later, Eichmann was found guilty of crimes against humanity and the Jewish people and sentenced to death. Executed on May 31, 1962, his remains were cremated and the ashes scattered over the Mediterranean Sea, outside Israeli waters. That is the only time the death penalty has been carried out in the country’s history.

Previous attempts to capture Eichmann can be traced back to 1946. That year, the Haganah (the pre-state Jewish army) dispatched a five-man team to Austria, where supposedly, according to reports filtering into the organization, the former Nazi officer was living. The team located his wife in the town of Bad Aussee and infiltrated the house by passing an Aryan-looking female agent as a maid. To their chagrin, Frau Eichmann revealed nothing of her husband’s whereabouts. Two years later, starved of information and with the 1948 War of Independence looming on the horizon, the team was recalled to Palestine. The hunt for Eichmann continued now under the aegis of committed men -chief among these Nazi-hunters, Simon Wiesenthal- whose independent investigations in search of SS officials led sometimes to significant achievements. But Hitler’s main executioner still remained at large.

Nine years later, in a remote town several hundred miles to the southwest of Buenos Aires, an interesting development began to evolve. There, in early 1957, a blind man of German Jewish extraction, a survivor whose parents had been killed in the death camps, became suspicious of a friend of his young daughter’s. She told him she had met a young man in Buenos Aires called Nicolas Eichmann. The youngster, she added, had adamantly defended Germany’s conduct during the war and expressed sorrow for the fact that the Nazis had been prevented from solving the «Jewish problem» in Europe. At her parents’ behest, she encouraged a friendship with young Eichmann. In successive encounters, the original suspicions became more solid. The blind man wrote a letter to Dr. Fritz Bauer, the public prosecutor in Essen, himself a Jew and a survivor, and a vocal anti-Nazi activist. Although Bauer replied to the blind man urging him to continue his inquiry, the latter -not fully enlisting the German government’s resolve -informed the Israeli mission in Cologne.

The Israelis dispatched an investigator to Argentina. After meeting the informant and seeing the house where Eichmann was apparently living, he ruled out the idea on the grounds that a man of Eichmann’s stature could not possibly be living in such a modest place and that the informant was unreliable. It took another three years for the blind man and Dr. Bauer, the German-Jewish prosecutor, to persuade the head of Mossad to send a second investigator. This time, the investigator was convinced. Although by now Eichmann had moved to another town, he was located, and pictures were taken of him secretly. The resemblance was indisputable.

In early 1960, Israeli secret agent Peter Malkin was monitoring Arab terrorist activity in the Israeli town of Nazareth when he was summoned to Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv.

«Have you ever been to South America?» his superior asked him, as soon as Malkin entered his office. «You are going to Argentina to capture Adolf Eichmann.»

Malkin was hesitant at first. He was of the view that the Arabs, more than former SS men, were threatening Israel’s existence now. Putting an arm around Malkin’s shoulder, his boss («Uzi» as Malkin calls him), steered him onto the balcony outside his office. In the distance, the old city of Jaffa was already illuminated, and waves of the Mediterranean Sea were stroking the old harbor.

«We are going to bring Adolf Eichmann to trial in Jerusalem,» Uzi said, «and you are going to capture him, Peter.»

The operation was code-named «Attila.» For all of Mossad’s legendary reputation, the early planning of this operation seemed to belong in a Maxwell Smart television installment more than in the formidable Israeli secret service operations portfolio. Malkin recalls that the previous agents dispatched to identify Eichmann had made so many procedural errors -from excessive surveillance of the Klement house, to asking questions where they were bound to arouse suspicion, to posing as Americans but speaking broken English -that he thought it was a miracle that they had not been discovered thus far. In addition, one night these agents had actually had a car accident on a quiet street only blocks away from the target house. After they got pictures of Ricardo Klement, not so discreetly according to Malkin, they sent the important film to be developed to a local camera store downtown –this, in a neighborhood full of Nazi sympathizers.

The new team was quickly assembled. It included seven agents plus the head of Mossad himself, Isser Harel, with a prospective female agent to join eventually. Most of them had lost relatives in the Holocaust. On April 27, the team assembled in Harel’s office for their last meeting on Israeli soil. The «Old Man,» as Harel was known in Mossad, addressed the agents: «We are about to set out on a historic journey. I do not have to tell you that this is no ordinary mission. We are going to capture the man who has the blood of our people on his hands. But we are not moved to this by the spirit of vengeance. We are animated by our deep-seated sense of justice.»

Shortly afterwards, Malkin flew to Paris carrying a German passport under the name of Maxim Nolte. Other members of the team joined him, and then all of them flew to Buenos Aires via Switzerland and Brazil. Arriving in Argentina on May 4, a week before Eichmann would be abducted, they drove toward the address they had been given –their base. «On the way,» Malkin recalls, «we almost freeze.» In the southern hemisphere it was winter and they had arrived sporting summer clothes.

Malkin spent a few nights eavesdropping on the humble house on Garibaldi Street, where Eichmann lived with his wife and son. The Nazi’s rigid habits facilitated the work of the Israeli spies: he would arrive home every day walking the same path at the same time. Malkin will never forget the moment of the capture: «Eichmann was coming from Route 202 toward Garibaldi Street. I chose to face him unarmed. I didn’t want to harm anyone.» And he points out ironically, «Obviously, we couldn’t tell people ‘we are going to capture Eichmann, so please stay away.» As Eichmann approached, Malkin said to him, «un momentito señor,» the only words he knew in Spanish. Eichmann stopped and took a step backward. Malkin immediately leaped at him and grabbed his right hand. Both fell to the ground. Another agent lifted Eichmann’s feet and then stuffed him in the car. «Ein Laut und du bist tot!» (One sound and you are dead), ordered Hans, one of the Israeli agents, to the prisoner as they drove to their refuge.

Thus Eichmann lost his freedom in 20 seconds –and a year later, his life.

Had Malkin been afraid? «No. It was a matter of responsibility,» he says, adding, «it required a lot of concentration. Many thoughts crossed my mind: of my mother; the beaches of Tel Aviv. I told myself ‘this is it,’ and caught him. It all lasted a few seconds.»

At the Safe House (as Malkin notes their refuge was called), they laid Eichmann down on a bed. Hans, a German Jew, was in charge of interrogating the prisoner. The interrogation began. «Was ist dein Name?» (What is your name?) This question had to be asked four times until Eichmann admitted he was Eichmann. He was queried about other high-ranking Nazi fugitives and his connections with right-wing parties in Argentina -to no avail. And then: «Do you know who we are?» Hans asked. After a long silence, the interrogator asked again: «Do you know who we are?» This time, Eichmann replied: «You are Israelis. I knew immediately.»

Eichmann was kept in captivity for ten long days. During those days, Malkin spent a great deal of time with the prisoner. It was an awkward, strange, unprecedented situation: Nazi and Jew, face to face. Only this time, the prisoner was the Nazi. How did Malkin -who lost relatives in World War II -relate to the monster he had in front of him during so many endless hours of vigil? At first, Malkin remained silent. Then he began to draw portraits of Eichmann with some sketch pencils he had. Eventually, Malkin would ignore the strict prohibition to talk to the prisoner. «Eichmann asked me if we were going to kill him. ‘No, we will take you to Jerusalem,’ I told him. ‘We want to understand what you have done. You will be prosecuted there; you will tell your story, because we need to understand why you did it.'» Malkin was surprised by the extent to which Eichmann would go to present himself as a mere bureaucrat obeying orders. «It was a job,» «I was a soldier,» «I was only a functionary,» «You must believe me, I had nothing against the Jews» were some of the excuses the former Gestapo officer would utter.

What shocked Malkin the most, though, was Eichmann’s surreal philo-Jewish statements: «I was never an anti-Semite. I was repulsed by Streicher and Der Sturmer.» And: «I always liked the Jews better than the Arabs.» He even claimed to have read Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat. «I fully understand the aspirations of the Jews,» Eichmann told Malkin at some point. «I can’t tell you how much I loved studying Zionism.» And also: «Had I been born Jewish, I’d have been the most fervent Zionist!» Eichmann told Malkin that he had studied Hebrew, too, with a rabbi in Berlin, and soon afterwards, he began to intone the «Shma Yisra’el,» the most sacred prayer of the Jewish people. Malkin was appalled. And angry. Given that Eichmann loved to talk about his children, Malkin asked him a simple yet profound question: «My sister had a boy, blond and cheerful as your son, whom I have seen many times during the last days. Why is it that your son walks freely, while my sister’s son can’t?» Taken by surprise, Eichmann answered a few seconds later: «Yes, but he was Jewish, wasn’t he?»

Malkin explained to me that he dialogued with Eichmann because he wanted to understand. Understand what? The bureaucrat’s indifference? The soldier’s coldness? The executioner’s inhumanity? The former Israeli spy elaborates: «I told myself: here I am, with this man. I have to ask him questions, because I lost many relatives. I had to understand. He looked so normal. I wondered if this was the real man. Perhaps we had made a mistake and had caught the wrong man. How could this person, who lives such a normal life, have sent six million people, one and-a-half million children among them, to their deaths?» Malkin’s words echo those of philosopher Hannah Arendt, who during the trial captured this feeling in the subtitle of her seminal book, The Banality of Evil. Elie Wiesel comments in his memoirs how he couldn’t fathom Eichmann as a normal human being, and how he would have expected, even preferred, to see the SS officer as a Picasso portrait -with four ears, two mouths, and three eyes.

In his book, Eichmann in My Hands, published in 1990, Malkin states he needed to understand how supposedly civilized people could descend to such depths of barbarism. «What was I hoping to hear? Even I didn’t know. Maybe a trace of real sorrow? Still I refused to accept it. There is a human being here, I would tell myself; he can be reached. I can make him see.» In the end, Malkin gave up. «I would never again be so unshakable an optimist about humankind. I would face the fact that perfectly normal-seeming individuals, products of conventional homes, can be so emotionally dead as to find themselves beyond the reach of human feeling. It was a powerful revelation, and a desperately sad one.»

Isser Harel would later protest Malkin’s decision to engage in dialogue with Eichmann. Malkin says that, besides his urge for understanding, he wanted to get information about the whereabouts of other SS men and that he always had a bigger purpose such as having Eichmann sign a statement in which he declared that he was willing to go to Jerusalem to stand trial. To get this statement, Malkin had served Eichmann red wine (bought by an agent for the Sabbath) and played him music. He even removed the blindfold from Eichmann’s face. The discovery of this scene caused a stir among Malkin’s peers. («You amuse this butcher of my family with my music!?» one of Malkin’s colleagues shouted at him at the time.) In his book, Malkin lets the reader see how close, in a sense, he became to Eichmann. «We conversed with surprising ease. If we had met, say, as seatmates on a long plane ride, we’d certainly have found enough in common -a shared love of nature and the wild, a common appreciation of certain kinds of music, a similar interest in world events -to make the trip pass more quickly. Both of us were social by nature and gave every appearance of accessibility.» After attending one of the sessions of Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, as he had promised Eichmann he would do, Malkin wrote: «I listened a moment longer, then rose and headed for the exit. I had seen who I came to see, the only soul in that vast, historic assemblage who had the slightest idea of who I was.»

But Malkin also writes that, after his talks with Eichmann, «I was unable to sleep, my stomach in knots, my head about to explode.» He admits that at some point he wanted to kill that Nazi. And he refers to Eichmann as a man with «an utter lack of humor and, even more striking, inflexibility of mind.» Friends they were not. It just seems that Malkin’s desperate search for meaning brought him emotionally too perilously close to the mass murderer.

Meanwhile, the escape plan had been concocted. In a few days, Argentina was going to celebrate its 150th anniversary, and an Israeli delegation for the first time was going to pay an official visit to the country. Isser Harel had arranged with top EL AL managers to sneak Eichmann out of the country in that flight. In the midst of so much tension, the Israeli visit itself heightened the morale of the team. As Malkin observed, it was seen as evidence «that our young country was assuming its full place among the nations of the world.» Yet, Malkin hastens to add that, thanks to them, it might as well have been the last time an Israeli plane would be welcome in Argentina. Upon arriving in Buenos Aires, Israel’s Foreign Minister Abba Eban gave a heartfelt speech about the beginning of a bright new era in bilateral relations. Obviously, and to his future diplomatic embarrassment, Eban had no idea that Eichmann was going to be spirited out of the country in that plane. «For a while, Eban did not speak to Harel,» recalls Malkin.

Malkin was in charge of putting Eichmann in disguise. He put some make-up on his face, making him look older, dressed him in an EL AL uniform (with a Star of David on it, symbolically enough), and showed him to a mirror. Malkin points out that Eichmann expressed the rather startling conviction that the disguise would work well. When the time came, they drove a sedated Eichmann to Argentina’s international airport. Since their arrival in Buenos Aires, some members of the EL AL crew (in fact, Israeli agents in disguise) had gone to the city only to return, pretending they were drunk. So when the soldiers guarding the control point saw a car carrying three sleeping EL AL crew members in the back seat, they laughingly waved the car through without checking anyone’s papers, thinking they were witnessing yet more drunken Israelis. The plane departed safely to Tel Aviv via Senegal. Once the airplane crossed Argentine airspace, the rest of the crew was informed who the extra passenger really was.

For Peter Malkin, however, that wasn’t the end of the story. Together with four other agents, he remained in Argentina to clear things up. Two of the agents left that same evening aboard a flight to Montevideo, Uruguay. Unable to book any flight out because of the anniversary celebrations, Malkin and his other two peers had to stay longer. They journeyed to Santiago, Chile, aboard a train that took them across the Andes for about 30 hours, only to find out that, for the following week, there were no flights out of Santiago, either. They contacted an Israeli living in Santiago, a friend of one of the secret agents, and traveled around the city posing as tourists. The following day, a newspaper headline caught their attention: Israeli agents had captured Eichmann and had taken him to Israel. «Does it say where they got him?» Malkin asked their Spanish-speaking guide. «No, there’s speculation about Kuwait. Also Argentina.» Finally they were able to get three airline tickets, two to Montevideo, one to Rio. Malkin and Aharon (one of the other agents) flew to Montevideo. To their shock, they learned in mid-flight that the plane was scheduled to make a brief stop in Buenos Aires. The trip went well. Once in Montevideo, they took a flight to Rio, where they obtained a flight ticket to Paris and finally an Air France flight home. By the time they arrived in Israel, almost three weeks had gone by.

Israel’s initial silence on the details of the operation prompted quite a flurry of international speculation. A Viennese newspaper reported that Eichmann had been brought to Israel in a submarine. A Cairo daily reported Eichmann had been located by communists in Iraq. In the Arab world, the capture was universally condemned as the Nazi official was called a «martyr.» The Jordanian daily A-R’ai complimented him for exterminating «members of the race of dogs and monkeys.» The Saudi periodical Al-Bilar praised the SS-Oberstumbannfuehrer for his courage. The Lebanon newspaper Al-Anwar published a cartoon lamenting Eichmann had not killed more Jews. For its part, Argentina´s government was furious. It submitted formal diplomatic complaints and threatened sanctions. It expelled Israel’s ambassador and lodged a resolution before the Unit Nations Security Council condemning Israel. (The resolution passed 8-0 with the United States voting in favor.) Eventually, the two countries made peace. Argentina’s national pride had been hurt, but its leaders understood all too well that the event had exposed the country as a haven for War World II criminals. The sooner the scandal subsided the better.

The capture of Adolf Eichmann profoundly affected Israeli society. David Ben-Gurion’s sudden announcemet in the Israeli Parliament that Eichmann was in the country electrified the nation. It was during the trial that Israeli society -back then, as now, preoccupied with its very survival- began to deal with the Holocaust publicly, intensely, and painfully. How did all this affect Malkin? «I am happy to have captured Eichmann. Not because people might see me as a hero; anyone in my shoes would ha done the same thing. I am happy because this exposed the subject and allowed the Israeli public to express itself. It let the survivors talk about their pain. This was the first time in which survivors could tell their stories.»

With vintage humor, Malkin then adds: “To participate in the operation was a risk. Had I not captured him, people in Israel would even today point at me in the street and say, ‘Hey look, that’s the guy who almost captured Eichmann.’ It would have been a personal disaster, you can imagine,» he confesses. Secrecy forced him not to say a word about the whole epic adventure for many years. The first time Malkin spoke about it was at his dying mother’s hospital bed. He was in Athens when informed of his mother’s deteriorating health and rushed back home «Mama, I captured Eichmann. Fruma [his sister lost in the Nazi inferno] is avenged. It was her brother who captured Adolf Eichmann,» he told her. In his book, Malkin says that in his field, only the failures become known. He refers to secret agents as «stars in a hidden firmament.»

Towards the end of the interview, Malkin surprised me with an unorthodox reflection: «I don’t like the word ‘Holocaust,'» he says, and connects this with September 11: «On September 11, 2001, the terrorists took four airplanes full of people and guided them toward buildings with more people in them. What Eichmann did was similar. He put people on trains and led them to their deaths. It is the same, the means of transportation is the only difference. Do not call it ‘Holocaust’; call it ‘terror.’ Eichmann was the biggest terrorist on earth.»

Twice awarded the Prime Minister’s Medal of Honor, Malkin left the Mossad in 1976. Currently he is an anti-terror consultant and devotes his time to writing and painting. But in spite of having been decorated for his service in the intelligence community, Malkin never received a specific award for the capture of the most sought-out Nazi fugitive. Does he care? «I didn’t want a prize of gold,» he says dismissing the idea with a wave of his hand, «but a thank-you note would have been nice.»

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Chirac-Hussein a dangerous liaison – 18/04/03

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Geneva – With the war in Iraq ending in American victory, French President Jacques Chirac swallowed his pride and phoned President Bush this week, after two months of cold detachment. Washington termed the exchange as «business as usual» and Paris as «very good.»

After months of moving heaven and earth to keep the butcher of Baghdad in power, now the French understandably fear that they might be left out of the scene in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The Bush administration should confirm those French fears.
The Iraqi-French connection is as legendary as it is appalling. «Under Chirac,» wrote Andrew Neil in London’s Daily Mail, ‘French policy toward Iraq has become a witches’ brew of duplicity, hypocrisy, ruthless self-interest and immorality.»

In 1975, then Iraqi Vice President Hussein traveled to Paris procuring nuclear technology. Then Prime Minister Chirac gave him a personally guided tour of a French nuclear plant. France agreed to sell two reactors to Iraq and to train 600 nuclear scientists and technicians. It also agreed to sell enriched, weapons-grade uranium (93 percent), even though a safer grade was available.

British Parliamentarian Jack Cunningham noted a short time ago that, Iraq being a country awash in oil, Chirac must have known that the reactors and uranium would be used to produce something else than electricity. Hussein later called this deal a «concrete step toward the production of an Arab nuclear bomb.»

In 1981, Israeli pilots bombed the Osiraq reactor before it would become operationally nuclear. Chirac called that Israeli action «unacceptable.» Over the years, France sold Iraq weapons, Mirage fighter planes, air-defense systems and surface-to-air missiles worth billions. This would eventually make riskier the coalition forces’ military intervention during Gulf War I.

Chirac and Hussein developed a close personal relationship, and the French leader was eloquent about it. Chirac said that he was «truly fascinated» by Hussein and called the Iraqi dictator a «personal friend» and a man for whom he had «esteem and affection — a great statesman whose qualities will lead his people toward progress and national prosperity.» Additionally, the European press has speculated that Hussein financed part of Chirac’s 1977 Parisian mayoral campaign.

Chirac became president in 1995 and was reelected last year. According to media reports, he assumed personal charge of France’s Iraq policy, set up a special «policy cell» within his office and secretly dispatched a personal emissary to Baghdad. That envoy was so welcome by Hussein that reportedly he even sat in on many cabinet meetings in Iraq. Chirac’s relations with Iraq prompted jokes in the Middle East.

French policy on Iraq goes beyond the personal rapport that Chirac cultivated with Hussein. France has a lot to lose from this war of liberation and deterrence; that’s why it opposed it as much as it possibly could. Anti-war demonstrators have claimed that this war was about oil. If there is any truth to that, it might apply to France’s interests more than America’s.

France chose the wrong side in this war. Now it must be held accountable for it. It must be made to understand that siding with dictators and terrorists does not pay. And if to make that lesson clear, Americans should return the Statue of Liberty to the French — who seem to have forgotten its symbolism (as Sydney’s Sunday Telegraph ironically suggested) — so be it.

Julián Schvindlerman, a political analyst, is author of Land for Peace, Land for War and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

U.N. panel too distracted by Palestinians – 28/03/03

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In December 1969 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2535 B, which for the first time used the word «Palestinians» in U.N. resolutions. Until then they had been called «Arab refugees.» That resolution referred to the «inalienable rights of the Palestinians» and their right to «self-determination.» Subsequently, the U.N. reaffirmed this «right» in many more resolutions.

And so we arrive at this year’s session of the Geneva-based United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), which recently debated under Item 5 of its agenda, «The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation.»

On the first day, even before the Item 5 deliberations, the chairperson of the UNCHR, Libyan ambassador Najat Al-Hajjaji, mentioned the Palestinians’ right to self-determination in her opening speech — a speech that she pronounced in Arabic, «In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.» When Item 5 was addressed, many Arab nations accused Israel of denying the exercise of this right to the Palestinians.

Anyone listening to the Arab delegates’ passionate plea on behalf of the Palestinians might reasonably conclude that Arab countries care deeply about the Palestinians’ plight. Alas, one would be wrong. The Arabs are less concerned about the lack of Palestinian self-determination than they are troubled by Israel’s exercise of her right to self-determination. They simply use the Palestinians as a rhetorical weapon to attack Israel in international forums.

The history of Arab-PLO and Arab-Palestinian relations is characterized by manipulation, deceit, treason and violence. Jordan and Egypt occupied the West Bank and Gaza for almost two decades; yet, neither country granted the Palestinians the right to self-determination. Jordan expelled the PLO from Amman to Beirut in 1970 the Syrians attacked the PLO there in 1976, and when the Israelis sent the PLO packing from Lebanon in 1982, no Arab nation (with the sole exception of Syria) intervened to help the «legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.» Colonel Moammar Gadhafi even called on PLO militants to commit suicide rather than surrender to the Israelis. Naturally, Arafat declined to accept the Libyan’s suggestion.

After its expulsion, no Arab country wanted to host the PLO. Finally, Arafat and his henchmen ended up in faraway Tunisia. In the early ’90s, when Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait froze their financial contributions to the PLO and expelled hundreds of thousands of Palestinian workers from their lands, even though these Palestinians had never participated in PLO decision making. A sober assessment led Arafat to state in 1985: «Honestly, the problems we face in our relations with some of our Arab brothers are much worse than those we face vis–vis Israel.»

So don’t be misled by the flamboyant declarations of Arab diplomats about Palestinian independence. They don’t care. They never did. Nor do they care about other people’s right to self-determination either, such as Tibetans or Kurds, who hardly received any mention during the Item 5 proceedings of this commission.

In a broader sense, we can affirm that all peoples living under a totalitarian yoke are being denied their right to self-determination. In a statement delivered this week to the UNCHR on behalf of U.N. Watch, I said: «Democracy. Government with the consent by the people. That is the essence of self-determination as a human right. The right to self-determination is not the right to have your own dictator.» I continued: «This agenda item on self-determination has been dominated for too long by this issue — the Palestinians. By focusing on one people, this commission does a disservice to more than 2 billion — yes, 2 billion — people who are ruled without their consent. . . . [Totalitarian] states have no credibility when they pronounce on self-determination for others, having denied it to their own people.»

So long as repressive states such as Cuba, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, China and Pakistan sit as members of the UNCHR, the rights     ‘ of the Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza will continue to receive much of this commission’s time, coddling and attention. International actors who truly care about freedom and democracy should do all that is in their power to make sure that the legitimate right to self-determination of all the peoples of the world be addressed by this body — and not just the Palestinians’.

Julián Schvindlerman, a political analyst, is author of Land for Peace, Land for War and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Stop violence against women – 07/03/03

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Today, International Women’s Day, will be observed as part of the 47th session of the Commission on the Status of Women, which opened this week at the United Nations headquarters in New York. The CSW is focusing on women’s human rights and the elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls.

In the Arab/Muslim Middle East, the situation is critical. According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, violence against women in the region is widespread. Under Islamic law (Sha’aria), Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir’s inheritance; Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance rights. In a Sha’aria court, the testimony of one man equals that of two women. In Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, women cannot travel abroad without the consent of their husbands or fathers. Women are expected to dress properly in public (e.g. covered from head to toe) in Iran, where otherwise they may be sentenced to flogging or imprisonment, and in Saudi Arabia, where the Mutawwa’in constantly harass women to enforce the dressing code.

Saudi women are not allowed to drive and cannot run a business by themselves. They have to enter buses by separate rear entrances and sit in separate sections from where men sit. Saudi girls are not permitted to participate in sport at school and colleges. Saudi women are not even admitted to a hospital for medical treatment without the consent of a male relative. While women have access to education at the university level, certain studies such as journalism, engineering and architecture are off-limits.

In Iran, where the penal code includes mandatory stoning of adulterous women and men, life for young women is so miserable that, according to a New York Times report, some street girls began to disguise as boys to avoid rape or falling victim to prostitution rings. «I wouldn’t have been able to survive in women’s dress. I would have been finished by now,» explained one such girl.

A 2000 study showed that 97 percent of married Egyptian women and 90 percent of Sudanese women have undergone genital mutilation. In Sudan, southern women are forced into slavery and regularly raped.

If one were to create an «horror index» to measure the abuse to which women and girls are subjected in the Arab and Muslim world, the «honor-killing» phenomenon would rank close to the top. In Jordan alone, about 25 percent of all killings committed there in 2001 were of the type.

Yotam Feldner of the Middle East Media and Research Institute described some cases: ‘Kifaya Husayn, a 16-year-old Jordanian girl, was lashed to a chair by her 32-year-old brother. He gave her a drink of water and told her to recite an Islamic prayer. Then he slashed her throat. Immediately afterward, he ran out into the street, waving the bloody knife and crying, I have killed my sister to cleanse my honor. Kifaya’s crime? She was raped by another brother, a 21-year-old man.»

An Egyptian, who strangled his unmarried pregnant daughter and then cut her corpse in eight pieces, explained that he killed her because he had «to put an end to this shame.» A Palestinian who hanged his sister with a rope said: »Society taught us from childhood that blood is the only solution to wash the honor.»

Taking perverse advantage of the societal stigma that «tainted» women carry in Palestinian society, Fatah men have seduced young women into illicit relationships to then blackmail them into recruitment for suicide operations — thus letting these women «redeem» themselves, Palestinian sources have told Israeli officials. So far, more than 20 young Palestinian women have committed terrorist attacks, including suicide-bombings, against Israelis.

With Iran and Sudan (Egypt until last year) sitting as members of the Commission on the Status of Women, it remains unclear to what extent the commission will manage to avoid politicization and stay focused on the matter concerning violence against women. For the sake of the scores of suffering women of the Middle East alone, let’s hope they succeed.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst in Geneva, and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Will the Arab Montesquieu ever emerge? – 14/02/03

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Follow the demographic trend in the Middle East, and you will realize that the region is in big trouble.

In the year 1000, the region’s population was about 30 million, and it remained stable until 1800. Between 1800 and 1900, it grew by 75 percent, reaching 58 million. During the 20th Century, it grew by another 565 percent, with the population today totaling 386 million.

Patrick Clawson, deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, observes that «the population increase over 1,000 years is essentially concentrated in a 150-year period between 1875 and 2025. This anomalous period of population growth has been a time of tremendous social, political and economic turmoil.»

In 2000, more than 40 percent of Middle Easterners were under age 15. Phyllis Oakley, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for population, refugees and migration, pointed out that by 2015 the world’s largest proportional youth populations will be living in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza (as well as Mexico and Sub-Saharan Africa). In other words, the Middle East today has one of the largest youth populations in the world.

What kind of future are Arab rulers shaping for their 150 million children? What type of role models are they providing? Sadly, an indicator can be found in a recent initiative by Egypt’s First Lady Suzanne Mubarak, under whose patronage a book was published telling the stories of the «heroes of the Intifada,» with an emphasis on Wafa Idris, the first female Palestinian suicide-bomber. Another indicator: The Lebanese newspaper Al-Anwar reported about a computer game that Hezbollah is developing: It will portray radical shi’ites as heroes and will give Arab boys the chance to fight Israelis in virtual reality. The CDs will be on sale later this month and available in Arabic, English, French and Farsi.

If rulers and leaders are failing so miserably, what about the intellectuals then? As U.S. diplomat Hume Horan asked, «Where are the Arab Reinhold Neibuhrs, Christopher Dawsons, Karl Barths, Martin Bubers? Where are the politically engaged intellectuals who can help a young Arab make coherent, responsible sense of a troubling modern world? They scarcely exist in the Arab world. The few that even try are threatened, jailed, forced into exile — or worse.»

New Republic Editor-in-chief Martin Peretz similarly asked about the Palestinians in particular: ‘ ‘ What hero of the struggle have the Palestinians produced? No Gandhi, certainly. No Mandela. And no Weizmann or Ben-Gurion, either. Their present hero is Saddam Hussein. Do they envision a classless society? No. A transparent society, a democratic society, an accountable society? No, no and no again. Will they transform and free the lives of women, of despised tribes, of gay people, of skeptics? Not a chance. By what vision then will they judge themselves? Nobody says because nobody knows.»

In fact, we know. And herein lies the problem — and the solution. When Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular, remove from their classroom walls the pictures of suicide-bombers; when they erase from their school curricula praise for jihad; when they stop the inciting rhetoric of blood and martyrdom in their Friday sermons at the mosques — then the pernicious hatred that Arab leaders have inculcated in the minds and hearts of an entire generation of young Arabs may begin to recede.

If they go the extra mile and begin to extol the virtues of life, peace, freedom and coexistence in their schools, media and mosques; and if they allow genuine independent thinkers to voice their views free of censorship or intimidation — then the seeds for societal change would have been planted. And who knows? Generations from now we might even find on Arab classroom walls portraits of the first Egyptian Montesquieu, Palestinian Locke or Saudi Jefferson.

If and when that happens, Middle East population statistics no longer will scare us.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst in Geneva, and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Between a rock and a hard place – 24/01/03

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Next Tuesday the Israelis will elect a new prime minister, or, more accurately, an old primer minister.

If polls are to be believed, and barring dramatic events during the weekend, in all likelihood, Ariel Sharon will be reelected as primer minister of Israel.

If readers are then left wondering what’s the purpose of this national election in the fist place — especially at a time when Israel is under a frenzied Jihadistic campaign of terrorist attacks, and with the war on Iraq perilously looming on the horizon — they should find solace in the fact that most Israelis share the feeling.

This explains to a great extent why the Labor Party probably will not be the voters’ favorite choice next week. Labor’s decision last October to leave a national unity government at times of war, and forcing the current elections on a population now queuing to get their gas masks, did not seem to have won the heart of most Israelis. The fact that Labor abandoned a government to which it had been invited after it was badly defeated by a Likud leader who won by landslide may shed more light on the voters’ prospective decision. This leader was chosen precisely to handle the violence and mayhem that Labor’s brainchild — the unbelievably nave and reckless Oslo process — brought about.

Furthermore, now Labor leaders seem comfortable criticizing a government to which they themselves had been part of for the last two years. After two months in the opposition, Labor seems to have forgotten the extent to which it shares responsibilities for the failures of the Sharon administration.

As pice de resistance, Labor crowned as its new leader a man who epitomizes all that was wrong with Oslo: an appeaser of Palestinian terror and incitement, willing to make concessions under fire, who, to top it all, rejected out of hand joining a Sharon-led government when polls show that most Israelis favored such governmental union. You don’t need a Sherlock Holmes to discover why Labor will likely loose next Tuesday.

Now let’s turn to the Likud. All the dirt that emerged from the primaries’ corruption scandals (where bribery allowed politicians’ chauffeurs and personal secretaries to become candidates to Parliament) left voters frustrated and, according to recent polls, cost the party around 10 seats in the coming elections. Its leader, Sharon, has to be credited for cultivating close personal relations with President Bush, for showing unexpected ideological flexibility and thus garnering centrist votes, and for advocating and managing to keep for a relatively long period of time national unity during this most difficult war.

But Sharon made a strategic mistake by discrediting — both domestically and internationally — the so-called military option without even trying it.

Sending F-16s to bomb terrorists hide-outs in Rammallah, destroying weapons factories in Gaza, and selectively targeting Palestinian terrorist leaders all over the territories, may have been necessary military measures. But they were certainly insufficient, and, in the end, these limited actions played all too well in the hands of Israel bashers who all they needed to vent their dislike of Israel was to see on CNN those Appache helicopters circling the skies of Tulkharem.

The famous and controversial former Israeli general was voted into office in 2001 to do one thing only: to crush Palestinian terror and restore security for all Israelis. Sharon knows how to do it. He did it very well in the past. And while circumstances may have changed and different approaches are indeed in order, all he has been able thus far to offer Israelis in the realm of security is a perpetuation of the unlivable status quo. Which is why he doesn’t seem to be that great of an electoral option either.

To their left, Israelis see Labor candidate Amram Mitzna: an appeaser of terror and advocate of failed policies. To their right, they see Likud candidate Ariel Sharon: an old general who failed to deliver the security he promised.

So, in the final analysis, next Tuesday Israelis will end up losing, irrespective of who the next premier will be. Israelis are choosing between bad and worse. They are, politically speaking, between a rock and a hard place.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst in Geneva, and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Conferencias destacadas

Movimiento pro-democracia en Irán reproduce artículo de Julián Schvindlerman en su website.

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Student Movement Coordination Committee for Democracy in Irán (SMCCDI)

Brave Iranian students – 03/01/2003
Miami Herald

Something did not go as expected at the latest «International Quds Day» in Iran. Introduced in 1979 by the Ayatollah Khomeini in solidarity with the Palestinian people and against Israel, the event has been held yearly on the last Friday of Ramadan. It has traditionally been a festival of anti-Zionist diatribe and pro-Palestinian fervor.

Not the latest one.

In response to the calls by the regime’s leaders to mark the event, Iranian students — still angered by the death sentence handed down for university Professor Hashem Aghajari and frustrated by the lack of freedom in their country — rejected the government’s appeal and actually called for a boycott of what they termed a «sham and mandatory demonstration.»

The statement, issued by the Student Movement Coordination Committee for Democracy in Iran, was strong in content, daring in tone and valiant in essence.

The communique referred to Iran’s political and clerical rulers as «the usurpers of political power,» «supporters of the culture of terror and violence» and «promoters of anti-Semitism.» It stated that «the people of Iran want to establish peaceful relations with the United States and believe that both the nations of Israel and Palestine have the right to exist.» It condemned the «pro-war factions» of Iran as well as the «Palestinian terrorist groups» and «Hezbollah thugs.» They called the International Quds Day «outdated» and said that observing it in support of violence was «a lunacy that is neither advantageous to the Palestinian nation nor does it coincide with the national interests of the people of Iran.»

To fully appreciate the intensity of this denunciation, one has to consider the place and context in which this statement was issued: in the Islamic Republic of Iran — where human rights are systematically violated, where religious coercion is rampant, where women are treated like cattle and political dissidents like bugs, and where boys and girls are subjected to public whippings for «sins» such as drinking alcohol, attending parties and listening to Western music. And in this land of oppression, a group of students goes public against the «rulers of tyranny» who show «disregard for the demands of their own people as well as public opinion in the West.»

Talk about courage.

Now contrast this with what’s going on at university campuses in the United States. To be sure, most American students are politically active and ideologically committed — but to the wrong causes, it seems. Many students are busy with pressure-campaigns to get their universities to divest from companies that do business with Israel. At rallies, some display highly offensive placards against Israel and the Jews.

That these students rarely have launched similar campaigns and demonstrations protesting human-rights violations in China, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Syria, or for that matter the Palestinian Authority, does not add much to their intellectual credibility. «The defense of peace and calm in the Middle East is not attainable through the support for terrorists and war-mongering groups,» wrote the Iranian students, which is basically what some American students are doing by supporting ideologically and morally those who launched war against Israel and encourage terror against its people.

How ironic. It’s in Iranian, rather than American, campuses that Palestinian terrorists are being called for what they are — and it’s not «freedom fighters,» «militants,» «activists» or any other sanitized terminology so widespread in the halls of academia in the West.

The Iranian students are teaching their American colleagues a lesson in ideological integrity. Whether the latter would learn it remains to be seen. But American students would be well advised to answer their Iranian friends in their hour of need. In a sentence that captured it all, the Iranian student movement told the ruling mullahs and the free world (they translated their manifesto into English): «Leave Palestine Alone, Think About Us.»

Anyone listening in Yale, Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, et al?

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst in Geneva, and a member of the American Jewish Committee.