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Discurso pronunciado por Julián Schvindlerman en la sede de la ONU en Ginebra.

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Discurso pronunciado en la 59° sesión de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas

El derecho a la auto-determinación
Ginebra – 2003
Por Julián Schvindlerman
Ex-Director Ejecutivo Adjunto, United Nations Watch

Señora Presidenta, yo nací en la Argentina. Cuando cursaba la escuela primaria, había solamente cuatro verdaderas democracias en Latinoamérica. Hoy hay veintiún democracias electorales y una única verdadera dictadura: Cuba.

Democracia: el gobierno con el consentimiento del pueblo. Esa es la esencia de la auto-determinación como un derecho humano. El derecho a la auto-determinación no es el derecho a tener a su propio dictador. En este espíritu, nosotros respaldamos el llamado del Presidente Bush a que un estado palestino sea democrático.

Este ítem de la agenda sobre auto-determinación ha estado dominado ya demasiado tiempo por este tema: los palestinos. Al enfocarse en un solo pueblo, esta Comisión perjudica a más de dos mil millones -sí, dos mil millones-de personas que están siendo gobernadas sin su consentimiento. Freedom House, una ONG respetada que ana­liza derechos políticos alrededor del mundo, ha ranqueado a cuarenta y ocho naciones del mundo como “no libres”, comparado con cincuenta y nueve “parcialmente libres”, y ochenta y cinco “libres”.

Catorce de los países “no libres”, cuyos ciudadanos no gozan del derecho a la auto-determinación, son miembros de esta Comisión. Estos estados no poseen credibilidad cuando se pronuncian sobre la auto-determinación para terceros, habiéndola negado a su propia población.

Embajadora Hajjaji, entiendo que usted oficia como presidenta a título personal, y no en representación del gobierno libio. Permítame entonces dirigirme a Ud. en tal capacidad. Como un ciudadano de un país libre que se ha librado de la dictadura, yo sinceramente le deseo a usted y a todos los ciudadanos de Libia las bendiciones de la libertad y el derecho a la auto-determinación; derecho al que a usted y a otras dos mil millones de personas les está siendo trágicamente negado en la actualidad.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Muslim conference vs. infidels – 24/10/03

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BUENOS AIRES — For those who do not subscribe to Samuel Huntington’s theory of a clash of civilizations, an illuminating event occurred last week in Malaysia.

Speaking at the opening of the 10th session of the Islamic Summit Conference, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad delivered an impassioned speech in which he presented a plan of action for Muslim empowerment and also made references disparaging Jews, whom he accused of ruling the world by proxy, getting others to fight and die for them and of being arrogant. He called for devising a pan-Islamic strategy that can win Muslims a «final victory» over Jews and asked: «Is it true that 1.3 billion people can exert no power to save themselves from the humiliation and oppression inflicted upon them by a much smaller enemy?»

At present Jews are ruling over three million Palestinians in the disputed territories. I don’t quite understand what «humiliation and oppression» Jews are inflicting upon Muslims spread over 57 nations. No Peruvian Jews, Italian Jews or American Jews are ruling over anyone else, either. I guess Mohamad meant to say Israelis, but he was unable to distinguish between the words «Israeli» and «Jew,» thus portraying the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a clash of religions. Or perhaps he meant what he said: that there is a confrontation between all Jews and all Muslims everywhere. In sum, a religious war.

Following a strong reaction in the West to his anti-Jewish comments, Mohamad claimed that he had been quoted out of context. This week, however, the unrepentant Malaysian premier confirmed his words.

The issue is not whether this Muslim leader is a racist. He is: In 1997 he blamed Jewish billionaire George Soros for his country’s economic crisis; during the war in Bosnia in the ’90s he welcomed thousands of Bosnian Muslim refugees but expelled Christians arriving with them. No, what is genuinely troubling is the applause he got from the emirs, sheiks and presidents in attendance who gave him a standing ovation. Not to mention denial. «No. I don’t think so,» Afghan President Hamid Karzai told the Associated Press when asked if he found the speech anti-Semitic. «I don’t think they were anti-Semitic at all,» agreed Yemen’s Foreign Minister Abubakar al-Qirbi.

I read the full text and found that the comments about the Jews were part of a wider picture. He devoted most of his time to a martial portrayal of current Muslim reality vis–vis the West. Though he did say that «not all non-Muslims are against us» and condemn suicide bombings, he seemed to imply that he advocates a change in method but not in goal. Thus his calls for enhancing scientific education in Muslim countries and adopting new approaches — as well as all the talk about «final victory» and concerted and coordinated action.»

Muslims ‘will triumph’

In Mohamad’s view, Muslims are treated with «contempt and dishonor,» their religion «denigrated,» their countries «occupied» and their people «starved and killed.» He stated that «our detractors and enemies . . . will attack and kill us, invade our lands, bring down our governments.» So «we need guns and rockets, bombs and warplanes, tanks and warships for our defense.» But «we will triumph in the end» because «we have the biggest oil reserve in the world. We have great wealth . . . We control 57 out of 180 [sic] countries in the world. Our votes can make or break international organizations.» (So much for the claim that Jews control the world).

While Mohamad’s anti-Semitic diatribe captured considerable media attention and diplomatic vituperation, it seems that the real story — the confrontation between Islam and the Jews in particular, and Islam and the West in general — went virtually unnoticed. If you do not want to see that speech and the positive reception it got by that central Muslim body as a vindication of the theory of a clash of civilizations, then don’t. But you can’t ignore the fact that most leaders in the Muslim world today seem to disagree with you.

Julián Schvindlerman is a writer and journalist in Buenos Aires.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Jet fighters show might, impetus to fight evil – 03/10/03

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Buenos Aires — The month of September started with Israeli fighter jets flying over Auschwitz, and it ended with Israeli pilots refusing to fly over the skies of Ramallah.

The Israeli Air Force was invited to take part in Poland’s Air Force’s 85th anniversary, and it was decided that a symbolic sortie above the death camp would take place. As they approached Auschwitz-Birkenau, the Israeli jets followed the path of the railways that took so many Jews to an awful death six decades ago. Thus, blue Stars of David attached to powerful jets proudly flew above a ground that once saw countless fearful Jews wearing a yellow Star of David on their way to their death.

The emotionally potent scene prompted an argument between the National Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau and the Israeli government. A museum official protested that «flying the (F-15s) is a demonstration of military might, which is an entirely inappropriate way to commemorate the victims.» Israeli authorities disagreed, indicating that a display of Jewish power at such a historically sensitive place was an adequate way to pay tribute to those murdered lacking a capacity to defend themselves.

The pilots, sons of survivors of World War II, were keenly aware of how dramatic that moment was. «We, Air Force pilots, flying the skies above the death camps, emerging from the ashes of millions of victims and carrying on our shoulders their silent cry,» said pilot Amir Eshel, «honor their courage and promise to be the shield of the Jewish people and their nation, Israel.»

«After the Holocaust,» said an Israeli journalist, «Jews understood that learning to fight was a sign of vitality, an embracing of life.» Well, let’s say that at least some Jews understood that. For three weeks after this dramatic event, 27 Israeli pilots signed a public letter criticizing their government’s policy of so-called targeted killings of Palestinian terrorist leaders. In the letter, the dissenters stated that they refused to «continue to harm innocent civilians» and to carry on «immoral and illegal» operations that were «part of the occupation.»

It was the first time in Israel’s history that pilots (even just a few of them, as in this case) refused to follow orders. The Israel Air Force reacted harshly, grounding the pilots and likening them to traitors in times of war. Exploiting the issue, Marwan Barghoutti, former head of the Tanzim fighters and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, currently on trial in Tel-Aviv, applauded the pilots: «They deserve the utmost praise for reaching the conclusion they were perpetrating war crimes.»

The whole affair is a delicate issue. It is admirable that military people would refuse to carry orders that they personally consider immoral. At the same time, however, when you find yourself supported by a Marwan Barghoutti, you should perhaps reconsider. After all, this man is on trial accused of having ordered 37 terrorist operations that claimed 26 lives and wounded many. Charges against him include premeditated murder, accessory to murder, incitement to murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder and participation in a terrorist organization. If he is on your side, you cannot claim to be morally right.

«How can the Jews, who suffered and survived the Holocaust, allow themselves to resort to such insufferable and unacceptable means against another people?» Barghoutti asked during his closing argument this week in court, to the cheers of dozens of supporters, among them members of the European Parliament from Italy and France — where the Mussolini and Vichy regimes collaborated with Hitler in the extermination of the Jews.

Which brings me back to the Israeli Air Force flight over Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Had those F-15s flown over the railroads leading to the death camp 60 years ago, many lives would have been saved. Israeli pilots possibly would have destroyed those paths to death that the allied forces never did. But there was no Jewish state then, no Israeli Air Force and no Israeli pilots commanding powerful fighter jets capable of fighting evil.

Today, thank God, there are Israeli pilots able and willing to save their brothers’ lives — even if that means having to fly over Ramallah.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Buenos Aires.

El Nuevo Herald

El Nuevo Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

El septiembre negro de Israel – 14/09/03

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En septiembre de 1970, el rey Hussein llego a la conclusión de que la Organización de Liberación de Palestina (OLP) representaba una amenaza intolerable contra su reino y ordeno un masivo ataque contra sus militantes establecidos en Jordania. La batalla fue terrible y «sobrepaso todos los horrores del fratricidio», según el historiador Samuel Katz.

Los soldados jordanos rodearon Amman, la capital, para impedir cualquier ayuda e inmovilizar los campamentos de refugiados. Soldados y tanques jordanos atacaron con tanta fiereza a los palestinos que unos 200 terroristas de la OLP prefirieron cruzar el no y rendirse a los israelíes antes de entregarse a los militares jordanos. En la historia de la OLP, este evento es conocido como septiembre negro.

Infortunadamente, los israelíes también tienen su septiembre negro, que ha significado más de 1,000 muertos, miles de heridos, innumerables viudas y huérfanos y toda una nación traumatizada. Y, sin embargo, todo empezó tan apaciblemente en los jardines de la Casa Blanca aquella bella mañana del 13 de septiembre de 1993. El mundo vio conmovido como el legendario héroe de la Guerra de los Seis Días, Yitzhak Rabín, estrechaba la mano del mítico líder de la revolución palestina, Yasser Arafat. Los enemigos mortales hacían la paz. Sus discursos fueron elocuentes y llenos de esperanza. Una nueva era había comenzado.

O así lo parecía. Porque cuando termino la ceremonia, se apagaron los aplausos, se marcharon los invitados y la prensa occidental empezó a proclamar el advenimiento de una nueva época en el Medio Oriente, ya podía constatarse la primera grieta en el recién inaugurado proceso de paz.

Porque ese mismo día, pocas horas después de hablarle de paz al mundo en ingles, el líder palestino fue entrevistado por la televisión jordana. En árabe y para un público árabe, pronunció otro mensaje. Habló de violencia y de destrucción al mencionar el «plan de 1974», conocido en el mundo árabe como «el plan de las fases» para la aniquilación del estado judío.

Fue así, con engaños y dobleces, como empezó el proceso político más controversial en la historia contemporánea del Medio Oriente. Un año después, Rabín, Shimón Peres y Arafat recibían el premio Nóbel de la paz. Desde entonces, Israel ha estado afrontando actos terroristas cometidos por palestinos bajo la bandera de una causa.

Los sucesos no se desarrollaron como los arquitectos del proceso de paz de Oslo habían pensado. Rabín fueasesinado por un fanático judío; olas de ataques terroristas suicidas bañaron en sangre a Israel; la sociedad israelí se dividió en líneas ideológicas; el sistema político sufrió una alarmante inestabilidad (con cinco primeros ministros sucediéndose democráticamente en un periodo de 10 años), y la economía se deterioró gravemente. Por otra parte, Israel perdió territorios de valor histórico y estratégico sin ganar absolutamente ningún reconocimiento ni legitimidad internacional. Israel sigue siendo una nación que tiene que justificar su existencia en las aulas universitarias, los foros de Naciones Unidas y las páginas editoriales de los periódicos.

Hace 10 años, bien intencionados israelíes rescataron a un grupo de radicales expulsados de Jordania y del Líbano y les dieron la bienvenida en su hogar. Les dieron una inmerecida legitimidad a una pandilla de criminales internacionales que habían estado perseguidos por las policías de 10 países. Les dieron fusiles de asalto y un santuario desde el que podían planificar la guerra que se avecinaba, y alentaron a las naciones del mundo para que les dieran dinero. Terminaron facilitando el establecimiento de una entidad terrorista en sus fronteras. Aunque parezca increíble, ingenuos israelíes ayudaron a la revolución palestina empeñada en su destrucción. Decir que eso fue un mal cálculo es un error: fue una negligencia criminal.

En septiembre del 2000, con la inauguración de la intifada de Al-Aqsa, terminó «el desastroso experimento de compartir la Tierra Santa con los movimientos nacionales de nuestro tiempo», como dijera Yossi Klein Halevy, un comentarista israelí. Cuando se hizo evidente que los presuntos pacifistas virtuosos no eran más que terroristas en hibernación, las visiones de un nuevo Medio Oriente y las fantasías de una coexistencia pacífica en la región terminaron por desaparecer.

El 13 de septiembre de 1993 será recordado eternamente como un día de infamia en la historia de Israel. Al recordar el décimo aniversario de ese épico desastre, mantengamos presente su más importante lección: que nunca más vuelvan las ilusiones románticas a empañar el realismo político.

Julián Schvindlerman es escritor y periodista en Buenos Aires.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Israel’s ‘black september’ – 12/09/03

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It was September 1970 when the threat to his kingdom became so intolerable that King Hussein of Jordan launched a massive assault on PLO fighters on its soil. The battle was harsh and «it surpassed all imagined horrors of fratricide,» according to noted historian Samuel Katz.

Surrounding Amman to prevent assistance and immobilizing the refugee camps, Jordanian soldiers and tanks fought Palestinian militants so fiercely that about 200 PLO terrorists preferred to cross the river into Israel and surrender there rather than be captured by the Jordanians. In Palestinian history, this event is known as Black September.

The Israelis, sadly, have their own Black September, too, with more than 1,000 killed, thousands wounded, scores of orphans and widows and an entire nation traumatized. It all began so nicely though, that beautiful, sunny morning of Sept. 13, 1993, at the White House lawn. Moved, the world saw legendary Six-Day War hero Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands with mythical leader of the Palestinian revolution Yasser Arafat. Bitter enemies were making peace. The speeches were eloquent and hopeful. A new era had just begun.

Or so it seemed. For -.- when the signing-ceremony had ended, the applause had died out, the elite guests had parted, the diplomats had finished toasting and the Western media had heralded a promising awakening in the Middle East — the first crack in the just-inaugurated peace process occurred.

On that very day, just hours after speaking of peace to the world, the Palestinian leader was interviewed by Jordanian television. In Arabic, to an Arab audience, Arafat delivered a different message. He spoke of violence and destruction through a reference to the «1974 plan,» known in the Arab world as the «Phased Plan» for the annihilation of the Jewish state.

Thus began, with fooling and duplicity, the most controversial political process in contemporary Mideast history. A year later; Rabin, Shimon Peres and Arafat were awarded a Nobel Peace prize. Since then, Israel has been facing Palestinian atrocities and terror.

Events unfolded rather differently from the way that the the Oslo process envisioned. Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish fanatic; waves of suicidal-terror washed Israel with blood; Israeli society fractured along ideological lines; the political system suffered alarming instability ; and the economy deteriorated badly. Israel lost historically important and strategically valuable territories without gaining in regional recognition or international legitimacy. Israel is a nation still having to justify its existence in university classrooms, United Nations fora and newspaper oped pages.

Ten years ago, well-meaning Israelis rescued a bunch of radicals expelled from Jordan and Lebanon and welcomed them at home. They granted undeserved legitimacy to a gang of international criminals once chased by the police of 10 countries. They gave them assault rifles and a sanctuary from which to plan the war that would come.

This encouraged the family of nations to shower them with money and ended up facilitating the establishment of a terrorist entity on its borders. Incredible though it may sound, naive Israelis assisted the Palestinian revolution committed to its destruction. To call this a political miscalculation is to understate the meaning of criminal negligence.

In September 2000, with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada, the «disastrous experiment of sharing the Holy Land with the less holy of ail national movements of our time,» in Israeli commentator Yossi Klein Halevy’s words, came to an end. When it became evident that those previously seen as peaceful were in fact Jihadists in hibernation, visions of a new Middle East and fantasies about the brotherhood of men finally began to evaporate.

Sept. 13, 1993, will forever remain as a day of infamy in Israel’s history. As we mark tomorrow the 10th anniversary of this epic disaster, let us bear in mind its most important lesson: Never again shall wishful-thinking cloud political realism.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Buenos Aires.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

It’s a road map to a new intifada – 22/08/03

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«It looks like the road to heaven, but it feels like the road to hell.»

George Michael – From the song Freedom

The road map was already flawed in its conception and problematic in its wording. On top of this, it is now clear that its implementation is an abysmal disaster: The Israelis are being pressured to go beyond what the document demands, whereas the Palestinians are being let off the hook as they breach their core obligation under the road-map terms.

This is a repetition of the Oslo mistakes, and it can lead only to a new intifada. The current one has not even ended yet, and unless the road-map implementation is urgently corrected, this diplomatic initiative will not only fail to reduce animosity and violence but also bring about more pandemonium.

Israel is being asked to release Palestinian prisoners and to stop building a security fence separating the two peoples. Neither requirement appears in the road map. Furthermore, at times when Palestinian suicide-bombers are blowing Israelis to pieces, the world community expects Israel to free Palestinians who have murdered civilians and who in all likelihood will resume their killings. It also demands that Israel stop building a security fence aimed at preventing more atrocities.

In other words; Israel is being pressured into releasing terrorists and keeping its borders unprotected so that these killers and their comrades in arms in the territories can go on jointly with their carnage. The sheer insanity of this dual demand is breathtaking.

The international community seems to be asking Israel to abet the murder of Israelis as a «confidence-building measure» to the Palestinian Authority. That the PA is the entity responsible for brainwashing and seducing an entire generation of Palestinians into criminal political violence can only add to one’s puzzlement as to why it merits a reward.

The Palestinians, for their part, are supposed to be fighting terror. This is their central commitment under the road map. But, until a few days ago, when for the first time he ordered the capture of those behind an attack, Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas had been saying that he would not risk civil war by confronting the radical elements of Palestinian society. Each time that Palestinian fanatics killed Israelis, including this week’s bombing in Jerusalem, the typical Abbas condemnation was to indicate that such attacks did «not serve the interest of the Palestinian people.» Does this mean that were such crimes against humanity helpful in advancing the interest of the Palestinian people, it would then be just fine with Abbas? And remember: He is the leader of moderation in Palestinian politics.

There should be just one standard to judge the parties’ performance vis-a-vis their obligations: We should assume that the respective leaderships are able to fulfill requirements that they have accepted, even if such fulfillment involves a domestic political price. Otherwise we would be tying contractual implementation to political feasibility, a principle that would exonerate the parties from their duties and thus kill the essence of any agreement.

Concerning the fight against Palestinian terror, this translates as no more talk about «root causes.» No more sympathy for real or imagined grievances. No more contextualizing, rationalizing or borderline justifying terrorism. If Abbas committed himself to dismantling the terrorist infrastructure, he should do it. That would serve the interest of the Palestinians so much better than whatever excuses apologists feel inclined to raise every time a Muslim fundamentalist decides to take innocent lives in Israel or elsewhere.

The twin suicide-bombings this week in Baghdad and Jerusalem tragically shed light on a simple truth: The way to stop terror is to fight it, not to excuse it.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Buenos Aires.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Israel’s fragile future – 11/07/03

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With more than 1,000 days of a savage war that has left 800 of its citizens dead and 5,000 wounded, Israel still confronts the tough options that it traditionally has faced vis–vis its bellicose Palestinian neighbors. They are so difficult — and some so extreme — as to render them almost nonoptions. Consider:

Transfer: This would involve the forced expulsion of 3.5 million Palestinians from the disputed areas. In addition to being morally repulsive, it would be practically impossible and politically unfeasible. It would surely elicit a violent Arab and Muslim reaction, turn the Jewish state into a pariah among the nations and split Israeli society.

Integration: One political entity between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, with Palestinians and Israelis living in it, would be demographically catastrophic for the Jews. In a matter of decades, the Jewish population would become outnumbered by the Palestinians, virtually rendering Israel an Arab state with a Jewish minority.

Perpetuation of status quo: While it is often claimed that the status quo is untenable, the fact remains that both Israelis and Palestinians have lived with it for almost three years already. Nevertheless, it represents a truly awful situation and is not a healthy policy option for the medium-to-long-term.

Separation: It can be achieved through peaceful negotiations or by unilateral action. The Oslo Accords intended to obtain the former whereas the wall being built at present aims at the latter. Both have a common denominator: They seek a divorce between the two peoples. Some Palestinians seem ready to grant it, but they want compensation in exchange: a state of their own. Most Israelis seem willing to call it fair enough, with some important qualifications.

Of the above, the only viable alternative is separation, which inexorably will lead toward Palestinian self-determination. But, given the violent impulses of Palestinian society and its cult of death built around suicide-bombing, Israelis are concerned that the emerging state would become a launching pad for more terror and mayhem. Striking a balance between Palestinian national aspirations and Israeli security concerns is therefore key to finding a realistic solution.

Thus Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Israeli prime minister and current minister of finance, articulated recently this concept in a Washington Post oped column: «The guiding principle is this: The Palestinians would be given all the powers needed to govern themselves but none of the powers that could threaten Israel. Put simply: The solution is full self-government for the Palestinians with vital . security powers retained by Israel.»

Which are those vital security powers? In a paper published some years ago, Zeev Schiff, Israel’s prime military analyst, described them.

The Palestinian state, he postulated: a) Won’t be allowed to establish military alliances with other nations nor host embassies of countries still officially at war with Israel; b) Won’t be allowed to let the deployment of foreign troops in its territory; c) Won’t be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons; d) Won’t have control over its airspace; e) Will be permitted to have a police force but not an army.

Will a society as chauvinistic and militarized as the Palestinian one ever accept such restrictions? If Palestinians want their state, they’d better. Had they behaved peacefully and never resorted to violent aggression against Israel, these restrictions would not be needed. But the Palestinians are not Swedes. The founding vision of the Palestinian national movement enshrined as a lofty principle the annihilation of Israel. The charters of the PLO, Fatah and Hamas call for the destruction of Israel, and a coalition of PLO, Fatah, Hamas and other terrorists has been killing Israelis for quite sometime.

One thing is clear: The Palestinians cannot challenge Israel’s existence and at the same time expect it to pander to their nationalistic demands. In the near future, they will be offered a state, for the third time already. At that point, the Palestinians will have to make a simple choice: either accept it with its limitations and prosper peacefully, or reject it and condemn the region to perpetual bloodshed.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst in Geneva and a member of the American Jewish Committee

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Likud makes a historic U-turn – 30/05/03

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The Israeli Right received a tremendous blow this week. On Sunday, a Likud-led right-wing government formally adopted the road map, the latest diplomatic initiative to restart Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. The national camp in Israel sees it as a deeply flawed document — concocted by Arabists in Europe, the United Nations and the U.S. Department of State — significantly parting from President Bush’s speech of June 24, 2002. Through such an acceptance, for the first time in its history, the Likud Party endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state in the land of Israel.

On Monday, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon publicly defended his support of the road map, terming the Israeli presence in the territories as an «occupation» which was «terrible.» That a prime minister from the Likud Party, and a key leader in the settlement enterprise, would adopt terminology that belongs in left-wing circles marks a political earthquake of mammoth proportions. This is indeed a monumental U-turn for the Likud.

The cabinet’s decision and Sharon’s declarations have to be understood in the current political international and regional context. Sharon probably believes that it would be unaffordable for an already isolated Israel to loose the support of the only true ally that the country has in the world: Bush’s America. Besides, it could be that he thinks that the road map will never really take off, given Palestinian domestic infighting, for instance. So, by accepting the peace plan, he essentially throws the ball back to the Palestinian camp, hoping that it won’t bounce and, thus, deflects global diplomatic pressure.

But — whatever the reasons motivating the government’s adoption of the peace plan, its endorsement of a Palestinian state and the premier’s controversial statements — the consequences of these developments cannot be underestimated. For they may have damaged, perhaps irreparably, Israel’s case — historically, legally and morally — and will have a profound impact on the country’s future.

The powerful link of the Jews with the land of Israel dates back millennia. It was in the hills of Samaria (the West Bank) where the biblical prophets taught mankind eternal lessons and Jewish kings such as David and Salomon ruled. Jerusalem and Hebron highlight the connection between the Jewish people and Israel in a way that Tel-Aviv and Haifa never will. By referring to the Jewish presence in these areas as an «occupation,» Sharon has portrayed Israelis as colonial settlers living in a land that does not belong to them — a point often made by the Palestinians, Arabs and Western critics of Israel.

‘DISPUTED TERRITORIES’

Such characterization will have a disastrous effect on Israel concerning world public opinion. Traditionally, Israeli diplomats referred to Samaria and Gaza as «disputed territories» ~ a fair, neutral terminology that reflects a fact: namely, that these areas are being disputed by both sides. It says nothing of whose right to these areas is more or less legitimate.

Sharon’s problematic wording likely intended to imply that the Israeli army cannot stay indefinitely in Ramallah and did not try to sever the Jewish tie to the Land («We are not occupiers. This is the homeland of the Jewish people,» Sharon would later clarify). Yet Israel’s historic right to the land has been called into question, its legal standing has been tarnished and the moral ground has been ceded to the Palestinians. All in one stroke by none other than Sharon. Unbelievable.

As to Palestinian statehood, some see it as the solution to Israel’s demographic predicament, wich is real and calls for sober answers. The Sharon administration understands this and seems to have grudgingly acquiesced to Palestinian independence. Naturally, it conditioned it on a complete and final rejection by the Palestinians of their so-called right of return.

The logic is simple. If the rationale to withdraw from the disputed areas is to prevent a demographic nightmare, then it would be evidently useless (not to say suicidal) for Israel, which is smaller than New Jersey, to grant Palestinian statehood and then accept millions of Palestinian refugees within its shrunken borders. Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas’ insistence on realizing this «right» of return, as he told the Israeli daily Ha’aretz this week after the cabinet approval of the road map, is not auspicious, to say the least.

With its historic decision, the Likud-led Israeli government has shown impressive ideological flexibility. Now it is up to the Palestinian leadership to respond in kind.

Julián Schvindlerman, a political analyst, is author of Land for Peace, Land for War (in spanish) and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Understanding Iran’s nuclear threat – 30/05/03

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«The use of a nuclear bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the ground.»

Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Long ago Israel placed Iran as its No. 1 national-security strategic threat. The five leading intelligence services (those of the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, France and Germany) have warned about the Iranian nuclearization program. The Islamic Republic has at least seven nuclear facilities. According to military experts, Iran could produce its first nuclear weapon in one to three years, and dozens annually afterward.

This — as Chen Zak, who served in the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, points out — despite Iran being the only state in the Middle East that is party to all nonproliferation agreements. That should be least surprising, given recent experience with Iraq and North Korea — both signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and holders of advanced, clandestine nuclear-weapons projects nonetheless.

The CIA describes Iran as the world’s «foremost state sponsor of terrorism.» It shelters al Qaeda leaders, provides military and financial assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas and other radical Muslim groups and already has weapons of mass destruction. This fundamentalist theocracy is ideologically and theologically committed to Israel’s annihilation.

Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, head of the Israel Defense Forces’ Planning and Policy Division, said cryptically: Everyone should be able to understand the nature of the conflict in the Middle East when there is an Iranian nuclear threat.»

The question is what to do, and much will depend on how the West — Washington and Jerusalem in particular — perceive Iranian motives. Is Iran’s nuclear program intended for defensive purposes only, a deterrent to a prospective foreign attack? Or is Iran intent on offensive aggression, as Rafsanjani seemed to have suggested? And against whom? Just Israel? If so, why is Iran developing missiles capable of reaching European capitals and the United States, too?

While the Iranians have shown to be more sophisticated than irrational Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the reckless Kim Jong IPs North Korea, questions remain as to how a nuclearized Iran might affect state behavior.

Michael Eisenstadt, a military and security affairs analyst, offers a few possibilities drawn from past experience: «During the Cold War, nuclear weapons generally moderated superpower behavior. Conversely, such weapons have not prevented India and Pakistan from engaging in low-level conflict and approaching the nuclear brink several times, while Iraq’s maturing weapons-of-mass-destruction programs bred confidence that led to increasingly aggressive behavior in the late 1980s, culminating in the invasion of Kuwait.»

While Iran’s potential conduct is not entirely clear, there seems to be consensus in Washington and Jerusalem about the need to stop, or at least contain or delay, Iran’s nuclearization project. And here another question arises: How to do it? First, diplomatic and economic pressure will be exerted. If this mix fails, a preemptive military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would not be ruled out.

Michael Knights, a defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, reminds us that preemptive strikes on nuclear sites are uncommon but not unprecedented. As Knights observes, Germany’s nuclear program was attacked during World War II; Iraq’s Osiraq reactor was bombed both by Iran and Israel in 1980 and 1981 respectively, whereas Iraq attacked Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant during the Iran-Iraq war.

Additionally, during the 1991 Gulf War the United States attacked the al-Tuwaitha nuclear site and in 1993 fired 44 Tomahawk missiles at the Zafaraniyah enriched-uranium facility.

Tehran could respond in various ways. It could use al Qaeda to attack U.S. cities by proxy. It could greenlight Hezbollah to launch the some 12,000 rockets it has, with hundreds of them able to reach as far as Haifa. It could sponsor terrorist operations against U.S. allies in the Gulf and Israeli and U.S. targets abroad.

It could try to destabilize the governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could unleash a chemical and biological direct attack on Israel and U.S. interests in the region. And, of course, it could resort to a combination of, or all these options at the same time.

This is not a rosy scenario. But neither is the prospect of radical mullahs having the capability to produce a Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the Middle East.

Julián Schvindlerman, a political analyst, is author of Land for Peace, Land for War (in spanish) and a member of the American Jewish Committee.

Miami Herald, Miami Herald - 2003

Miami Herald

Por Julián Schvindlerman

  

Four steps to become the Palestinian Sadat – 09/05/03

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What do Palestinian Mahmoud Abbas, American David Duke and British David Irving have in common? They all are Holocaust deniers. In what do they differ? In that just one of them, the Palestinian, was made a prime minister.

Only in the Middle East can such a thing possibly happen. Imagine the scandal, were Duke to run for U.S. president or Irving run for Parliament in Great Britain. In the West, these «historical revisionists,» as they liked to be called, belong to the fringes of society. In the West Bank, they belong to officialdom.

Ironically enough, Abbas was sworn in on Holocaust Remembrance Day. His Ph.D. thesis — he devoted many years to «prove» that the Zionist movement collaborated with the Nazis in the extermination of the Jews during World War II and to question the fact that six millions Jews were killed during that period — was submitted to a Soviet university in 1982, and two years later it was turned into a book. He was 50 years old then. This was no youthful mistake.

But he is a moderate, we are told, just as we were told years ago that Bashar Assad, son of Hafez, was a moderate because he surfed the Web and studied ophthalmology in England. Of course, this was before he accused the Jews of killing Jesus, with the pope at his side and in front of millions of television viewers. Yasser Arafat was also heralded as a moderate during the happy days of the Oslo process, and it took many fateful years and precious lives for the world community to see that the Palestinian peace prophet was in fact an unredeemed terrorist.

All this notwithstanding, I wouldn’t write Abbas off out of hand. Anwar Sadat was a Nazi sympathizer — in 1953 he even published in a Cairo daily an open letter to Adolf Hitler, praising him («I bless you with all my heart,» he wrote) — before he made his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1979 and paid for that with his own life in 1981. Could Abbas be the Palestinian Sadat?

To prove his Western supporters right, Abbas should issue four public statements in English and Arabic, both on CNN and Palestinian television. He must:

  • Repudiate his doctoral dissertation.
  • Announce a stop to official incitement in mosques, media and school curricula.
  • Reject the so-called Palestinian right of return to Israel.
  • Call for an end to the four-decade-long «armed struggle,» and not just the «military aspects» of the intifada.

These announcements inevitably would carry a considerable domestic political price, but without them, Abbas’ tenure would be a nonstarter as far as the peace project is concerned.

Abbas will notbe able to do this as long as Arafat blocks him. Arafat, the perpetual saboteur, will do everything in his power to remain politically relevant, and he retains considerable leverage given that he controls the portfolio of peace negotiations. Unfortunately, this internal power struggle will explode in the direction of Israel – as the latest terrorist attacks against Israelis amply demonstrate.

Israel celebrated its anniversary this week. At 55, it painfully knows the cost of political fantasies.

Necessary skepticism toward an interlocutor whose peace credentials are yet to be established, combined with measured optimism in the country’s ability to gain regional acceptance, might prove to be a healthy recipe for national survival and lasting peace.

Julián Schvindlerman, a political analyst, is author of Land for Peace, Land for War and a member of the American Jewish Committee.