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Forty years ago last week, SS-Oberstumbannfuehrer Adolf Eichmann was executed in Israel. He had been arrested at the end of World War II and confined to an American internment camp, but he managed to escape to Argentina. He lived there for 10 years under the name Ricardo Klement until Israeli secret agents abducted him in 1960 and spirited him to Israel.

Eight months after his trial opened in Jerusalem, Eichmann was found guilty of crimes against humanity and the Jewish people and was sentenced to death. He was executed on May 31, 1962; his remains were cremated and the ashes scattered over the Mediterranean Sea — outside Israeli waters. This is the only case in which the death penalty has been carried out in Israel.

Eichmann’s record is notorious. He was the head of the Department for Jewish Affairs in the Gestapo from 1941 to 1945 and was chief of operations in sending three million Jews to the extermination camps. After the war, he became one of the most sought-out Nazi fugitives.

The international community condemned Israel’s kidnapping of Eichmann, but it was nonetheless able to see the justice in, and legitimacy of, Israel’s action. The trial itself, marked by strict adherence to legal procedure, elicited worldwide admiration, and the Nazi’s execution was seen everywhere as a crucial vindication in the post-Holocaust era.

Everywhere, that is, but in the Arab world. There, Eichmann’s capture, trial and execution were condemned, and Eichmann was venerated as a «martyr.» The Jordanian daily A-Ra’ ai praised him for exterminating «members of the race of dogs and monkeys.» The Saudi periodical Al-Bilar saluted him for his courage. The Lebanese newspaper Al-Anwar published a cartoon lamenting the fact that the Nazi officer had not killed more Jews.

But let us view this Arab beatification of Eichmann in its proper historical context.

When Hitler took power in 1933, telegrams of congratulations were dispatched from Arab capitals. In 1937, Nazi Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels praised the Arabs’ «national and racial conscience,» noting that «Nazi flags fly in Palestine and they adorn their houses with Swastikas and portraits of Hitler.» In 1943, Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, spoke highly of the » natural alliance that exists between the National-Socialism of Great Germany and the freedom-loving Muslims of the world.»

Historical inversion

Pro-German parties and youth movements attuned to the trappings of National-Socialism sprouted in Syria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Even Nazi slogans were translated into Arabic. A Mideast song popular in the late 1930s crooned: «No more Monsieur, no more Mister. In Heaven Allah, on Earth Hitler.» The Fuehrer himself was even Islamicized under the new name of Abu Ali.

Love of Nazism spread like wildfire in the region. Among the many Nazi sympathizers at the time were Haj Amin al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Arab Higher Committee; Ahmed Shukairi, first chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization; Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, who became presidents of Egypt; Islamic fundamentalist leaders; and the founders of the Pan-Arab socialist Ba’ath party, currently ruling Syria and Iraq. (One Ba’ath leader proudly recounted: «We were racists, admiring Nazism, reading their books and sources of their thought. We were the first who thought of translating Mein Kampf»).

Praise for Hitler among Arabs did not vanish after the war. In 1965, a Moroccan commentator on Middle East affairs wrote this in the French magazine Les Temps Modernes: «A Hitlerian myth is being cultivated on a popular level. Hitler’s massacre of the Jews is eulogized. It is even believed that Hitler did not die. His arrival is longed for.»

In mid-2001, an Egyptian columnist wrote in the government-sponsored Al-Akhbar: «Thank you, Hitler, of blessed memory, who on behalf of the Palestinians avenged in advance against the most vile criminals on Earth.» Two months later, Egypt’s Press Syndicate awarded this writer its highest distinction.

Since Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933, the Arabs have been adulating Nazism. It seems that some things never change — or perhaps some things do. Now the Arabs accuse the Jews of being Nazis. In this way, Hitler’s loyal fans are equating the primary victims of his genocide with the Nazi executioners themselves.

The defining expression of chutzpah is a man who murders his parents and then begs the jury for pity on the grounds that he is an orphan. But the Arabs’ perverse historical and moral inversion requires a new definition for the term. For chutzpah cannot sufficiently represent this incredible gall.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Washington D.C.

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History is a cruel teacher, even for those who learn. Those who dont, as philosopher George Santayana quipped, are condemned to repeat their mistakes. What, then, can we learn from the history of the Palestinian-Israeli saga? Basically, three interrelated lessons.

• To call the Palestinian- Israeli quagmire a «conflict» is a misnomer. As Norman Podhoretz recently elucidated, the «Palestinian-Israeli conflict» denomination suggests a nonexistent mutuality of intentions in what should be described as the «Palestinian war against Israel.» In fact, Israel has been defending itself against unabated Palestinian aggression for more than 50 years.
• The current Palestinian uprising is not a rebellion against «occupation» but rather the latest violent manifestation of the old Palestinian/Arab enmity toward a Jewish sovereign presence in the land of Israel or Palestine.

As early as 1920, in what at the time was called a pogrom, Palestinian/Arab nationalists attacked the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine, killing five and wounding more than 200. In another assault the following year, 90 Jews were murdered and hundreds wounded. In the 1929 Palestinian/Arab attack, 133 Jews were killed and almost 400 wounded. Then, between 1936 and 1939, the «Arab Revolt» took the lives of 2,394 Jews. Each of these intifadas happened before the state of Israel was established. Once the state was founded, the Palestinians launched two more violent uprisings: the first from 1987 to 1992, and the current one initiated in 2000.

But pogroms, revolts or intifadas have not been the only weapons wielded by Palestinian/Arab aggressors. Indeed, Israel found itself under unprovoked military attack on at least five occasions: 1948, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 1991. Of these wars, the first two occurred before the Israeli «occupation» began. Also, the Palestine Liberation Organization was created in 1964 — three years before Israels capture of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Any fair-minded observer cannot escape the evident conclusion that the Palestinians are fighting not merely Israeli presence in the «territories» but Israel’s presence anywhere in the Mideast.

• All diplomatic proposals based on territorial compromise have been systematically rejected by the Palestinians. In 1937 the British Peel Commission recommended partitioning Palestine into two states: an Arab state on 90 percent of the land, and a Jewish state in the remaining 10 percent.

The Yishuv (as the Jewish community in Palestine was called at the time) fiercely debated this proposal, which departed considerably from past British promises to the Jews, but in the end accepted it. By contrast, the Palestinians/Arabs strongly rejected the proposal at a meeting they convened in Damascus.

Ten years later, a similar situation unfolded. The United Nations adopted Resolution 181, calling for two states in Mandatory Palestine — one Arab, the other Jewish. Again, even though this proposal fell short of its expectations, the Jewish community accepted it; the Arabs did not. Then, only three years after the Holocaust, the latter launched a war of extermination against the newly born state of Israel.

After the 1967 war, the United Nations adopted Resolution 242, giving birth to what is now considered a pillar of Mideast diplomacy: the land-for-peace formula. Israelis accepted it and even offered the Arabs a return of captured territory in exchange for peace. At a meeting in Khartoum, the Arabs replied with the now infamous «Three Nos»: no negotiation, no recognition, no peace. Eventually, and only after being persuaded of the futility of war, Egypt and Jordan embraced the «land for peace» concept.

But the Palestinians did not. So, when in July 2000 Israel presented them with a generous offer that met most Palestinian territorial demands, they chose to pay back with violence. In retrospect, we can see the Oslo Accords as a false truce in the spirit of the genocidal PLOs 1974 Phased Plan.

This pattern of the last 65 years is clear: Every reasonable territorial proposal raised by the international community and based on mutual compromise has been met with Jewish acceptance and Palestinian rejection. In light of this long, tragic experience, it’s hardly surprising that so many recent European proposals and U.S. missions have failed. Without a recognition of the true nature of the motives underlying Palestinian aggression against Israel, all diplomatic efforts unavoidably will fail as well.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Washington D.C.

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Beirut, Tunis and Ramallah form a pattern in which, every 10 years, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat buries himself in his own political hole only to be rescued by foreign intervention. Consider:

• Beirut 1982. After prompting a full-scale retaliatory attack from the Israeli army, Palestinian forces begin to retreat. As the Israelis advance to Beirut, Arafat finds refuge in the vault of the Bank Nationale de Paris. Only international intervention can save him from Ariel Sharon’s hands.

During the following 10 days, some 10,000 Palestinian fighters prepare to depart Lebanon. They arrive at the seaport — under international protection – where they board Greek ships displaying the flag of the United Nations, courtesy of then-Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

Arafat’s safety is guaranteed by officials of the Red Cross, the United Nations and the ambassadors of Greece and France, each of whom accompany the PLO leader as he approaches the port. Hidden in the shadows, Israeli snipers follow Arafat’s every move through their rifle lenses, waiting for the order that would never come. Secret cameras allow Israeli intelligence officers to watch Arafat as he disappears over the horizon, safely on his way to Tunisia.

• Tunis 1992. Having sided with Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, the PLO finds itself politically isolated and bankrupt. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia cut ties with the PLO and expel 300,000 Palestinian workers.

Meanwhile, the Islamic fundamentalist movement, Hamas, is gaining support among the Palestinians in the territories, posing a threat to the PLO leadership. The first intifada is waning. Israel remains as strong as ever. But at this point and with Norwegian mediation, the Israelis choose to rescue the PLO from its imminent descent into historical irrelevance.

Rightly seeing the Oslo Accords as a political life vest, the Palestinian organization learns to speak in the language of «peace,» «recognition» and «reconciliation.» Two years later, the exiled PLO departs Tunisia to rule most of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Once again, Arafat has been rehabilitated.

• Ramallah 2002. Confined to his Ramallah headquarters, surrounded by Israeli tanks, isolated from the rest of the world, Arafat is again under military siege. After a spate of horrific suicide bombings, Sharon calls him «the enemy» and declares that Israel is «at war.» The Palestinian leader defiantly proclaims that he is ready to become a shahid —martyr — yet he rushes to his bunker to make telephone calls urging the international community to come to his rescue. Typically, the world community defers to his request.

While the media protest Israel’s incursion into the autonomous areas, the U.N. Security Council passes a resolution calling for Israel’s withdrawal. As ambassadors complain about Israel’s defensive measures, «peace activists» arrive at Arafat’s headquarters to lend moral support.

Colorfully, filmmaker Oliver Stone, novelist José Saramago and anti-globalization radical José Bové pay visits to Arafat. Emboldened, Europe sends a delegation to «unblock the logjam» in the Middle East. In an unexpected speech, President Bush urges Israel to withdraw immediately from the territories. The following day, U.S. envoy Anthony Zinni pays a visit to «General Arafat,» as the Palestinian leader calls himself now. Shortly afterward, Secretary of State Colin Powell, too, visits the Palestinian leader.

A triumphant Arafat happily welcomes each one of them; his saviors have returned.

What’s next? Although Arafat is legendary for his survival skills, much of the credit for his political and personal longevity rests with the international community and some Israelis who seem determined to rescue him regardless of how often, deeply and nonsensically he gets himself into political quicksand.

Despite all the drama surrounding his «isolation,» these are not the chairman’s last days. Thanks to his rescuers, we are just witnessing yet another phase in Arafat’s political saga of survival.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Washington D.C.

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In 1994, a deranged Israeli settler shot to death 29 Palestinian worshipers at a mosque in Hebron. With the exception of a few right-wing extremists, Israelis unequivocally condemned the atrocity.

There was no rationalization related to the «root causes» of the settler’s rage, no equivocation about the «frustration» of Israelis under constant Palestinian stoning and harassment, no justification on the grounds of some higher cause.

Since the Palestinian Authority was created and Yasser Arafat made his victorious comeback to Palestine from exile, more than 75 suicide and car bombings have racked Israel. Only last month 125 Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorists.

Yet Palestinian condemnation of these attacks is rarely heard. In the exceptional instance when a bombing is condemned, it’s done in English and with such ambiguity that one is left wondering who are the real victims. In Arabic, it is different. Palestinian suicide bombers are praised as «martyrs» and their parents congratulated for the «honor» of having such a son or daughter. Shockingly, the parents themselves rejoice.

Even today — as suicide bombings terrorize Israelis — Arab leaders and Muslim authorities find themselves unable to condemn terrorism — Palestinian terrorism, that is.

The «Israeli crimes» against «freedom-loving» Palestinians are clearly protested. As the Arab League’s 22 members sanctions Palestinian attacks against Israelis as legitimate resistance to occupation, the 57-state Organization of the Islamic Conference rejects any link between terrorism and the Palestinian struggle.

In their morally distorted view, an Israeli soldier who shoots at a Hamas militant in Jenin who’s planning an attack against civilians commits an act of terror, but not so if a Palestinian blows himself up in Netanya and kills many Israelis.

Rather, the latter is the act of a freedom fighter, a shahid. As such, he or she enters the pantheon of Arab and Muslim heroes. Iraq, by the way, pays $15,000 per martyr to the families of these «heroes,» while Saudi Arabia has granted relatives of suicide bombers free trips to Mecca.

To their credit, and unsurprisingly, Israelis have not descended to their neighbors’ level of macabre barbarism. There in lies the fundamental moral difference between the parties in this conflict.

In fact, only a few of the ethnic groups that suffered throughout, modern history have resorted to terror. For instance, the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust did not engage in a campaign of systematically murdering German civilians after World War II. After Hiroshima and Nagazaki, Japanese did not generally carry out revenge attacks against Americans. Nor did most Americans react with rage against Muslims after the abominable Sept. 11 attacks. Despite the legitimate feelings of resentment, the peoples of these nations made an ethical decision vis–vis their behavior toward their former or present enemies.

But the Arabs and Muslims have not. Morality is not permitted to intrude in their political machinations.

Suicide-bombing is not the result of some desperate reaction to unbearable suffering. It is a deliberately chosen, carefully planned, generously financed, indiscriminately implemented and collectively celebrated policy of death. Palestinian suicide terror has sealed with blood and fire a collective «Mark of Cain» on this generation of Arabs and Muslims.

The Palestinian embrace of, and Arab and Muslim support for, suicide attacks underlies the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not about a clash of two national movements aspiring to the same piece of land. This isn’t even a clash of cultures, or of two distinct civilizations. The Palestinians’ bestial, primitive and depraved practice shows that this conflict is really about a clash between civilization and barbarism.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Washington D.C.

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When one realizes that some 300 foreign journalists have entered Israel in the past 10 days, joining the 500 who arrived in February — not to mention those hundreds already permanently assigned to the country — one cannot but be amazed at the fascination that this tiny nation holds for the international media. Often, this fascination blossoms into obsession — an obsession that can lead to distorted perception, which in turn results in biased reporting.

The Washington Post provides an outstanding case study of such misrepresentation. And you don’t even have to be literate to see it.

In the last two weeks, The Post has run about 25 pictures of the Palestinian uprising/war; 15 portrayed Israeli tanks on their way to a refugee camp or a Palestinian city, or Israeli soldiers searching or arresting blindfolded Palestinians. In other words, Israel’s «expansionist aggression.»

When a Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up in a Jerusalem cafe killing 11 and wounding more than 100, The Post (on March 10) published four pictures: two of the carnage and two of Israeli soldiers arresting Palestinians. The qualification was obvious: You cannot show Israeli victims without exposing Israeli oppression, the «roots» of terrorism.

When Palestinian gunmen killed six Israelis traveling in the north of the country, The Post (on March 13) captured the event with a picture showing Israeli soldiers, in full combat mode, searching for the terrorists. No Israeli victims were pictured.

Not that The Post doesn’t have a soft spot: You can almost always find pictures extolling Palestinian victimhood such as the one published on March 13, illustrating a Palestinian father comforting his son in front of their ruined home — destroyed by the Israeli army — in the Jabalya refugee camp (Israel targeted the camp as a breeding ground for terrorism).

Another example: The March 2 picture highlighted «protesters in Gaza wav[ing] flags as Israel continued an assault on two West Bank refugee camps. «The effect of the sunlight behind the Palestinian flags was artistically brilliant.

But The Post’s best photo commentary thus far was published on March 8 (the same picture later showed up in Time): white doves soaring in front of an advancing Israeli tank. A Pulitzer for sure.

All this is not to say that pictures portraying Israel in a negative light shouldn’t be published. The problem is that the media generally tend to display a disproportionate amount of these pictures. In fact, this selective photo editing is an unrepressed manifestation of the hostility that some journalists harbor toward Israel. Or, alternatively, of the infinite sympathy that some in the media feel for what they perceive as the Palestinian longing for freedom and independence. Their perspective is hopelessly trapped in the David-versus-Goliath framework that the journalists themselves helped to create during the first intifada.

Still, it requires a wide stretch of the imagination to see «underdogs» in murderous terrorists who blow defenseless civilians to bits only to be later eulogized by their society as honorable martyrs. It’s an even greater stretch to portray the Palestinians — who have all the geostrategic weight of the Arab world behind them, with 22 countries resting on a vast territorial expanse that surpasses Israel’s meager size in a 1/500 ratio — as the weaker side.

In any case, the media’s professed motto «to sympathize with the weak» is wrong. Terribly wrong. The media should not side with perceived victims; their job is to report, not to take up causes. But if they must adopt a stance, they at least should side with the righteous side, not just necessarily the weak, for the weak can be mistaken. Indeed, the media have to abandon the insufferable moral equivalence between self-defense and aggression even, as best-selling author Bernard Goldberg argues, » if it means going against their liberal sensibilities and reporting that sometimes even the underdog can be evil.»

But the media won’t. They won’t abandon conceptual prejudice, they won’t embrace fair reporting, and they won’t strive for professional objectivity. For doing so would destroy the simplistic paradigm that journalists have built up and perpetuated — driven by their cherished intellectual fetish of moral relativism, the «blame Israel first» Pavlovian reflex, and their Holy Secular Bible that commands them to «see no evil.»

In sum, to maintain even moderately balanced reporting in this conflict, journalists would have to jettison the axiomatic principle by which they always see Israelis as victimizers and Palestinians as victims. This, they cannot do.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Washington D.C.

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Picture this dramatic scene. During a heated meeting in the Oval Office, President Bush — angered at comments made by CIA Director George Tenet — slaps Tenet across the face and pulls a gun on him, shouting, «I will kill you!» Trembling from nerves, Bush lets the gun fall to the floor a few seconds later, and Tenet leaves the room accompanied by the uncomfortable silence of the president’s aides.

Difficult to imagine? An equivalent drama occurred just last week between Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat and Preventive Security Chief Jibril Rajoub at the PA’s Ramallah headquarters.

It seems that the two-month-old decision by the Israeli government to designate Arafat as «irrelevant,» sever ties with him and confine him to his Ramallah office — surrounded by tanks — is having quite an impact on the chairman’s emotional stability.

For one of the world’s most well-known frequent flyers, this was to be expected. Whenever there was a major crisis in the Palestinian-Israeli arena, Arafat was sure to be found in the sky on his way to Cairo, Moscow, Beijing, Durban or Paris — anywhere but Gaza or Ramallah. One of his confidants once remarked to an Arafat biographer that, during a particular month, Arafat had spent more time in the air than on the ground. So legendary is this reputation that some Arab political commentators have called the Palestinian leader a «flying-carpet revolutionary.» No doubt he is upset by his confinement.

But Arafat’s stress is most deeply rooted in the message that Israel’s decision conveys. By cutting him off, for the first time in a decade, the Israelis have declared to the PLO leader, the Palestinians, the Arab world and the international community that Arafat is in fact expendable. He understands this message well; hence his outraged reaction. So do, for that matter, his many strongmen, many of which are engaged in a bitter power-struggle behind the scenes.

In any case, Arafat is mortal and, sooner or later, by natural cause or human design, he will depart from this world. Who will be the next leader of the Palestinian national movement? This is how the political horizon looks:

Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), secretary-general of Fatah, are the two most likely candidates to emerge from within Palestinian Authority bureaucracy.

• Both are close to Arafat, both have taken part in high-level diplomatic negotiations with the Israelis, and both are regarded as moderates in much of the West.
• Neither, however, enjoys significant support from the grass-roots leaders of the intifada or the masses.

Alternatively, power could fall into the hands of militant leaders, such as Tanzim head Marwan Barghouti or the PLO’s historic «foreign minister» Farouq Qadoumi, a staunch opponent of the peace process.

Analysts agree that much will depend on whether the succession takes place during a period of political negotiations or military confrontation with Israel. Under more-tranquil circumstances, PA leaders may have a better chance of enticing popular support. Conversely, during clashes, the militants will have the upper hand. Whoever the successor, he undoubtedly will be dependent on the good graces of the many security-service heads who have their own power ambitions.

In the current geographical reality (discontinuous territory divided by borders, settlements and checkpoints) the Palestinian polity may end up broken into cantons of power controlled by various security leaders. Israeli TV commentator Ehud Ya’ari terms this scenario the «United Palestinian Emirates,» in which Arafat’s successor would be a nominal head running a de- centralized administration whose legitimacy would rest in the provinces. In addition to affecting Palestinians in the territories, Arafat’s passing will impact those in Israel (Arab Israelis) and in Jordan, as well as Palestinian refugees all over the Arab world.

Moreover, the failure of Palestinian secular nationalism will give space to the radical Islamic groups that are eager to see «Palestine» governed by the laws of Shari’a. Also, don’t expect Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain aloof; they will view this unstable context as an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Palestinian political arena.

Thanks to Arafat’s legacy of selfish leadership, managerial incompetence and political myopia, his successor will not have an easy time. As a consequence, neither will Israel, the United States or any other concerned party in the Middle East quagmire.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Washington D.C.

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Jan. 22: A Palestinian opens fire with an M-16 assault rifle against Israelis waiting at a bus stop in  Jerusalem, killing two and wounding 40.

Jan. 25: A Palestinian suicide-bomber explodes himself in a cafe near the old bus station in Tel Aviv, wounding 25.

Jan. 27: A Palestinian suicide-bomber kills one and wounds more than 150 in downtown Jerusalem.

This is the war of liberation of the Palestinian people.

It would be bad enough were this the only front in which Israel had to fight back. But Israel often finds itself under diplomatic and media assault, too. In addition, it’s now also under attack on another, unusual front: that of corporate warfare.

This involves subtle, almost silent, yet scandalous aggression in the business filed. The name of the game is legitimization or delegitimization. The political battle for Jerusalem, settlements and other contentious issues is thus waged not only in the corridors of the United Nations and chancelleries of the world but also in the executive offices of multinational corporations. For example:

• Giant cellphone company Motorola’s most recent service manuals exclude Israel from its list of worldwide company branches – despite the fact that Motorola has been operating in Israel for 38 years. Too impatient to wait for the Palestinian state to be established, Motorola added to its list the nonexistent state of «Palestine» and listed Jerusalem as a Palestinian city.
• The British department store Harrods, owned by Egyptian businessman Mohammed al-Fayed, has recently removed from its shelves Israeli-made products manufactured in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. Another British megastore, Selfridges, joined the boycott just before last Christmas.
• The McDonald’s website in early 1999 did not show Israel, where the hamburger empire has 80 restaurants, in the company’s country list.
• Burger King came under heavy economic pressure in recent years after it opened a restaurant in a settlement. The idea of selling hamburgers there was considered politically atrocious by some dictators, sheiks and kings in the Arab world.
• The Italian manufacturer United Colors of Benetton refrained from building a new outlet in the «territories» to avoid the Arab wrath.
• The U.S. telephone conglomerate Sprint was persuaded to remove a picture of the Dome of the Rock from a commercial ad tailored for Israel.
• The hotel chain Days Inn, too, was persuaded to withdraw its name from a lodge in a settlement.
• Ben & Jerry’s Israel prompted a torrent of Arab condemnation after the company announced its ice-creams were made with water from the Golan Heights.
• The Walt Disney Company found itself in the eye of the storm when it had allow Israel to portray Jerusalem as its capital in a millenium pavilion in Epcot Center, and it gave in.

It would be wrong to conclude that these companies are fundamentally pro-Arab or anti-Israel. In truth, they are simply protecting their economic interests, and it would be reasonable to assume that they’d rather not get involved in the Arab-Israeli quagmire at all.

Costumers, though, have a right (and a duty) to voice their opinions, and companies do adjust to the degree of pressure they receive from patrons. To the best of my knowledge, after receiving complaints from Israel and the Jewish diaspora, Motorola, Selfridges, McDonald’s, Burger King and Ben & Jerry’s have backtracked on their original decisions of vowing to Arab blackmail.

This awkward situation turns every Jew, Muslim, Arab, Israeli and their respective sympathizers into » political consumers.» They are an «army» whose weapon is their purchasing power. In Shakespearean fashion, these consumers decide «to buy or not to buy» from companies that adopt a negative attitude toward one of the parties. Sublimely ironic as it may be, the simple act of purchasing a product has thus become politically charged.

Next time you chose to eat this or that hamburger, to have this or that ice-cream, or to use this or that cellphone, you will be making a dramatic statement of political proportions.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Washington D.C.

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Last week Israeli naval commandos seized the Karine-A freighter as it was transporting more than 50 tons of weapons – worth tens of millions of dollars – through the Red Sea. Its destination: the Palestinian Authority-controlled Gaza Strip.

Evidence reveals extensive PA fingerprints. The ship was purchased in Lebanon in October 2000 for $400,000 by Adel Moghrabi (also known as Adel Awadallah), head of the PA’s weapons-acquisition office. The ship’s captain, Omar Akkawi, is a veteran Fatah member and a naval advisor to the PA’s Ministry of Transport, and the 12-member crew included other Palestinian officials. The operation was funded by Fuad Shubaki, head of finance administration in the PA’s security services.

Yet Palestinian officialdom denies any involvement in the affair. That Akkawi is also a Coast Guard colonel adds little to the PA’s credibility. Ironically, the 1,000-man Palestinian Coast Guard is an elite unit whose function is to prevent the smuggling of weapons and goods into the Palestinian areas. The fact that the freighter may have been purchased at the very beginning of the second Palestinian intifada does not speak well of the PA’s intentions. Who knows when plans for its acquisition began? Those well-versed in history may recall that Yasser Arafat’s first call for a cease-fire in the present intifada was issued, precisely, in October 2000.

This is not the first time that the PA has engaged in weapons smuggling. Since its inception in 1994, the PA has been bringing in illegal weapons through various underground tunnels along the Egyptian border. Attempts to smuggle arms through the Mediterranean Sea have been foiled by the Israeli army, and similar operations through the Jordan Valley have been thwarted by Jordanian authorities. Although in previous instances the weapons were provided to the PA by radical Muslim and Palestinian groups based in Lebanon and Syria, this time Iran was presumably behind the deal.

This marks a disturbing development for Israel. Because Iran apparently had not supplied arms to the PA before, this incident may herald a worrisome rapprochement. This past December, Iran’s president called for the destruction of Israel by nuclear means. The mere thought of unconventional Iranian armament falling into the hands of hostile Palestinians located just a few miles from Israel’s population centers is chilling indeed.

The quantity and quality of materiel seized is no less disquieting; the PA has never before possessed these types of weapons. The deadly cargo included LAW anti-tank missiles capable of blowing up Israeli tanks; highly potent C-4 explosives with which a car bomb or suicide bomber could bring down an entire building; and 122-mm Katyushas rockets that would put almost every Israeli city in peril. Given that 70 percent of Israel’s population and 80 percent of the country’s economic infrastructure are located just minutes away from Palestinian towns, one can only imagine the major disaster that was averted by the capture of the Karine-A.

This episode alone should give pause to the advocates of Palestinian statehood. While we could argue about the historical, legal, political and moral legitimacy (or lack of thereof) of such an entity, a Palestinian state would carry strategic dangers for Israel. Arafat’s «ship of death» (as The Jerusalem Post described it) has proven that this threat is not a figment of Israeli paranoia.

Indeed, the potential Palestinian state would not be democratic, peaceful or stable. It would be a small state sandwiched between two enemy neighbors. It would be overpopulated, poor, underdeveloped – and deeply resentful of Israel. As military analysts have pointed out, a Palestinian state behaving like Denmark or Switzerland obviously wouldn’t represent an existential risk. But a state along the lines of Iran or Iraq undoubtedly would put in jeopardy the Jewish state’s survival.

It would be unrealistic to assume that the Palestinian state’s political culture would be any different from that of other Arab countries. It would be unrealistic, too, for Israel to expect that the new state treat it any better than other hostile Arab nations have in the past. If the performance of the Palestinian Authority thus far is any indication of future behavior, there is little room for optimism.

The Palestinian state may be inevitable at this point. Inevitable, however, is no synonym for desirable.

Julián Schvindlerman is a political analyst and journalist in Jerusalem.